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Warren E. Burger and Change in Legal 
Education 
By Dr. Jeffrey B. Morris 
Among American Chief Justices perhaps only 
William Howard Taft and Harlan Fiske Stone have 
demonstrated as much interest in aspects of American 
legal education as Warren E. Burger. None has devoted 
as much effort to nudging legal educators, the bar and 
the bench towards making significant changes in the 
law school curriculum. Burger has inspired a major 
debate over the question of the training of trial 
advocates, stimulated the growth of courses in trial 
advocacy taught by active practitioners, and called for 
the teaching of legal ethics to begin on the first hour of 
the first day of law school. Burger's prescriptions have 
not been abstractions, but rather down-to-earth pro-
posals, leavened by a belief in trying out new ideas as 
experiments rather than casting them into stone for all 
time. 
Burger's interest in legal education first received 
national attention when he addressed the American 
Bar Association Convention on August 10, 1969, less 
than two months after he had become Chief Justice. As 
a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals, 
however, he had expressed concerns a number of 
times, most notably in speeches to the American 
College of Trial Lawyers in 1967 and to the Phi Alpha 
Delta legal fraternity in 1968. 
The Burger critique of the state of American legal 
education ought to be viewed from the perspective of 
the standards he believes the bar, the individual 
lawyer, and the law school ought to meet. He once 
wrote that a strong, independent, courageous and 
competent bar is an imperative for a free people (In re 
Griffith, 413 U.S. 717, 732, 733 (1973)). To Burger, 
lawyers must also serve as problem-solvers, 
harmonizers, and peacemakers. They must act as 
indispensable middlemen in the social process, 
providing a lubricant for satisfactory disposition of 
controversies and for gradual change in the law. 
Burger is concerned, however, that the legal 
profession has a monopoly over certain services. He 
believes, therefore, that lawyers have a special 
obligation to the public to produce the best system of 
justice at the lowest possible cost. The operation of a 
law school is a stewardship. Like other fiduciaries, 
those running law schools ought to be accountable, in 
this case -- to the public. Burger believes that the law 
school is uniquely situated to shape the habits, 
professional standards and ideals of prospective 
lawyers. 
The Chief Justice has commended law schools for 
their abilty to teach students how to read and analyze 
appellate opinions as well as for their ability to teach 
principles of law. But he has argued that "the modem 
law school is not fulfilling its basic duty to provide 
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society with people-oriented counselors and advocates 
to meet 'the expanding needs of our changing world." 
In the tradition of Alfred Z. Reed and Jerome Frank, 
Burger is sharply critical of the law schools' insistence 
on "single-minded, rigid and universal adherence" to 
the case method, which he calls the 'opinion' or 
'appellate' method. For Burger, exclusvie reliance 
upon the method of Langdell is a form of escapism, 
taking students far from the realities of life and the grist 
of daily practice. As a result, students can graduate 
from law school able to give a lucid "dissertation on 
refinements. of corporate spinoffs or vertical mergers:' 
but unable"to advise a pregnant unmarried girl, or old 
people needing help with social security." Surveys 
support Burger's concern that students graduate from 
law school poorly equipped to deal with facts, draft 
documents, cope with clients, or negotiate with other 
lawyers. 
While acknowledging the need to improve education 
in such areas of practice as counselling and 
negotiation, Burger chose first to seek improvement in 
the preparation of lawyers for trial work. Although 
agreeing that America's best advocates are the equal of 
. any, Burger believes, based upon his experience as a 
trial judge, that "something less than half of the 
lawyers who appeared there were minimally qualified 
to perform their function." 
Although the ordinary person hiring an attorney may 
well believe that a law school graduate who has passed 
a bar examination is prepared to perform reasonably 
well to protect or vindicate his or her rights, Burger has 
The innovative moot courtroom is the home of a 
unique seminar, Art of Advocacy, specifically pro-
posed by the Chief Justice as"a prototype of ."legal 
education for the next century and offered thIS past 
year at Marshall-Wythe. 
stated that "if the concepts of recall applicable to motor 
vehicles under government standards were applied to 
law school graduates, the recall rate would be very 
high indeed on those who go into the courts without 
substantial added training." 
. Surveys of state jU'dges, federal judges and lawyers 
made in 1978 by the Federal Judicial Center, the 
American Bar Association, Law School Admissions 
Council, and the American Bar Foundation gave 
support for Burger's view that there is a "serious 
problem" of competence of trial counsel which is 
directly related to the amount of attention given to trial 
advocacy-related subjects in law school. The most 
serious consequences of this problem--inadequate 
representation, higher costs, and delays--are felt by the 
'consumer.' 
Burger's views of how lawyers should be trained 
have been shaped by a number of experiences. They 
have clearly been affected by his own training at the 
William Mitchell College of Law where the teachers 
were. largely leading practicing lawyers and sitting 
judges (among them William D. Mitchell, later 
Attorney General; Pierce Butler, later a U.S.Supreme 
Court Justice; and Frank B. Kellogg, later Secretary of 
State and Judge of the World Court). Later, Burger was 
himself a faculty member at William Mitchell while he 
was an active practitioner. Burger's outlook on the 
training of lawyers was clearly affected by his 
observations during twenty-three years of practice. 
Repeated visits to England have deepened his 
appreciation for the virtues of British legal education. 
Exposure to the best kind of advanced medical training 
at the Mayo Clinic, where he was a long-time trustee, 
has sharpened his views of the value of the more 
practical training doctors receive. He clearly has been 
affected by what he observed while sitting by 
designation as a District Judge in the District of 
Columbia. 
Burger clearly believes that law schools should 
continue to educate in legal theory and analysis. But 
they must not stop there. Training in the practical 
aspects of lawyering should begin in law school and be 
available to those students who want it. Experienced 
lawyers and judges should be drawn into teaching, 
working with the regular faculty. From the outset of 
legal education, professors should help students to 
become involved with hard facts and with the real 
problems of people, for "that is what makes cases." 
Like many students and legal educators, the Chief 
Justice does not believe that it is necessary to devote 
three years to the learning of the fundamentals of law 
and the processes of legal analysis. In 1978 Burger 
proposed to the American Law Institute that three law 
schools attempt to teach the fundamentals (including 
substantial advocacy-related learning) in. two long 
years, leaving the third year (a full twelve-month 
period) comparable to a medical internship, devoted to 
involement in every phase of the litigation process 
under the guidance of skilled trial advocates and law 
professors. 
In the John F. Sonnette Memorial Lecture. which 
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Burger gave at the Fordham University School of Law 
on November 26, 1973, the Chief Justice proposed that 
the first step towards certification of specialists be 
taken with trial advocates. This led to a vigorous and 
important debate. In the ferment which followed, the 
Committee on Qualifications to Practice before the 
United States Courts in the Second Circuit (Clare 
Commiteee) proposed that courses in five subject areas 
and participation or observation of trials be a 
prerequiSite to admission before the courts of that 
circuit. Chief Justice Burger appOinted· a committee of 
the Judicial Conference, chaired by Chief Judge Edward 
J. Devitt (District Judge for the District of Minnesota). 
The Committee to Propose Standards for Admission to 
Practice in the Federal Courts was made up of twelve 
federal judges (ten of whom were trial judges), six 
practicing lawyers, six law school deans and 
professors. as well as four law student consultants. 
After surveying all federal District Judges and holding 
public hearings, the Committee reported to the Judicial 
Conference in September 1979. Thereupon, the Judicial 
Conference recommended to District Courts that they 
adopt a student practice rule and support continuing 
legal education programs in trial advocacy and federal 
practice subjects, encouraging the practicing bar to 
attend. The Conference also recommended that the 
ABA consider amending law school accreditation 
standards to require that all schools provide courses in 
trail advocacy. 
The Judicial Conference did not enact specific 
admissions standards. Instead, the Conference 
(continued on page 15) 
Student Legal Services: 
Protecting Students' Rights 
In September of 1978 Student Legal Services opened 
its doors at 153 Richmond Road and began an 
ambitious attempt to provide assistance with legal 
problems for William and Mary students. Over the past 
three years, the program developed and expanded as it 
continued to provide much needed legal service to the 
student community. SLS now consists of a sixty 
member volunteer staff of interested law students from 
the Marshall-Wythe School of Law. Under the 
guidance and direction of the program's faculty 
advisor, Professor John Levy, and SLS attorney Stephen 
Harris of Williamsburg, the law student interns 
research and investigate legal and quasi-legal matters 
for students at the College of William and Mary. 
Student interns assist clients with a wide variety of 
legal problems. Although SLS does not handle crimi-
nal action and usually cannot represent a student in 
court proceedings, the range of situations in which SLS 
can and does offer aid is extensive. The most common 
problems brought to SLS by concerned students in-
volve landlord-tenant conflicts, auto repair and mer-
chandise warranty problems, immigration and depor-
tation issues, sales frauds and employment disputes. 
SLS is extremely active in its attempts to inform stu-
dents about their own legal rights and the procedures 
that must be followed to protect those rights. Staff 
members take personal interest in each client's case 
and often very favorable results can be achieved in the 
student-client's behalf. 
The SLS Student Rights Branch developed over the 
last year and has quickly become active in numerous 
students' rights issues at the College of William and 
Mary. SLS does not assist in conflicts between students 
at the college. However, the Student Rights Branch has 
been actively assisting students in disciplinary 
hearings, honor code actions, grade appeals and 
challenges to college policies. SLS interns have 
represented numerous students before college 
disciplinary councils and each semester more students 
turn to SLS for assistance in defending themselves 
against discipline charges prosecuted by the Dean of 
Students' Office. Recently, law student interns have 
been extensively involved with student complaints 
against college grading poliCies and faculty hiring 
policies. The grading policy problems will require 
continued efforts by SLS interns and college admini-
strators and hopefully, the results will be as successful 
as the effort put forth concerning the college's faculty 
hiring policies. The intense efforts of SLS interns and 
cooperation of college administrators resulted in a new 
faculty hiring policy being written and published in 
the 1980-81 Faculty Handbook. Today, more than ever 
before, student rights issues are being brought to the 
forefront of legal and academic consideration and the 
Student Legal Service program expects to continue and 
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increase its participation in advocating student in-
terests and protecting student rights. 
For the future, SLS has extensive plans to undertake 
new endeavors and expand participation in issues 
concerning students at William and Mary. Aided by 
funding from the Board of Student Affairs, S18.plans to 
publish several more pamphlets, similar to the the 
Landlord-Tenant pamphlet published last semester. 
These pamphlets will provide students with 
comprehensive information concerning legal topics 
that are particularly relevant to college students. 
Student forums addressing specific areas of the law are 
being planned to provide students at William and Mary 
with easy access to information about their own legal 
problems. In the spring, S18 will sponsor 8 regional 
conference at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law. The 
conference is a culmination of efforts by SLS interns to 
initiate a communications and support network 
involving student legal aid programs On college 
campuses from Maryland to North Carolina. Successful 
organization of such a program would add new 
dimensions to the resources and services S18 could 
provide for students at William and Mary. 
The Student Legal Service program at the College of 
William and Mary has enjoyed a productive and active 
infancy. With the continued support of the College of 
·William and Mary, the Marshall-Wythe School of Law 
and the local legal community, SLS will continue to 
provide students with assistance and guidance in the 
protection of every student's legal rights. 
Student Legal Service Offices at 216 Jamestown Road 
America's Shield Laws: Twenty-Six Variations 
of the Newsman's Statutory Privilege 
By Philip J. Kochman 
Introduction 
In 1972 the Supreme Court in Bronzburg v. Hayes·, 
declined to affirm the privilege of a news reporter to 
refuse to identify confidential sources of information to 
a grand jury. In a five-to-four decision authored by 
Justice White, the Court opened its opinion with an 
unequivocal declaration: 
The issue in this case is whether requiring newsmen to appear 
and testify before federal and state grand juries abridges the 
freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
We hold that it does not. 
The Court refused to grant journalists a constitutional 
privilege, but it did note that the States were free to 
implement any sort of "shield law" considered 
necessary or desirable. 
Since Bronzburg the focus of the conflict between the 
newsman's claim of confidentiality and the court's 
need for information has been the state level. At the 
time the Court decided Bronzburg seventeen states had 
shield laws, and one, California, has incorporated its 
statutory privilege into the state constitution. Judicial 
interpretation of the privilege has also increased 
sharply in the last eight years. Because Bronzburg 
rejected the constitutional privilege, newsmen have 
relied more-and-more on the states' statutory privilege 
to support claims of confidentiality. 
The twenty-six state privileges extend varying 
degrees of protection to journalists. The laws differ 
dramatically, offering various answers to the questions 
of who should receive the privilege, what information 
should be covered, and what showing, if any, is 
necessary to overcome the presumption of privilege. 
Other factors which may affect the application of the 
privilege include the nature of the proceeding in which 
the privilege is claimed and whether the information 
sought has been published. Judicial interpretation of 
the twenty-six shield laws had let to further variations 
and unpredictability. 
This paper will examine some of these state-created 
privileges and their application by the state couts in 
criminal trials. It is in this area that the privilege often 
runs into direct conflict with the rights guaranteed a 
criminal defendant by the Sixth Amendment. It is also 
in this area that the privilege has received its roughtest 
treatment, often yielding because of narrow judicial in-
terpretation of the statutes. 
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Background 
The battle in America's courtrooms over a 
newsman's privilege from testifying about sources and 
information acquired in the process of newsgathering 
began in 1848, but did not become a controversial issue 
until the 1960's. Under President Nixon the Justice 
Department sharply increased the use of subpoenas 
against reporters, beginning with the 1969 trial of the 
"Chicago Seven" for charges of inciting riot at the 1968 
Democratic National Convention. During the 1960's 
and early 1970's newsmen usually based their claim of 
privilege on the First Amendment, relying on shield 
laws to a much lesser extent. 
In 1972 the Supreme Court addressed this 
constitutional privilege claim for the first time. In 
Bronzburg, and its two companion cases, United States 
v. Caldwell and In re Pappus, reporters refused to 
disclose certain information to grand juries based on a 
First Amendment privilege.1 The Court refused to 
recognize any absolute or qualified privilege which 
would protect from disclosure, under an agreement of 
confidentiality, the criminal conduct of a reporter's 
new sources of incriminating evidence against them. 
The Court found that a reporter had the same duty as 
any citizen to furnish information as a witness. Because 
the First Amendment does not prohibit the enforce-
ment of other general laws serving a substantial public 
interest against the press, the Court ruled the 
government's interest in law enforcement - the 
investigation and punishment of crime - was not 
outweighed by the reporter's speculative claim of a 
"chilling effect" on the free flow of news to journalists 
and the public. 
Although the Bronzburg opinion dealt with grand 
jury investigations, dictum in Justice White's opinion 
strongly suggest that the majority's view of the 
privilege extends to ciminal trials as welJ.3 When the 
privilege is asserted in a criminal case the conflicting 
considerations closely resemble those in the grand 
jury." The need for obtaining evidence may be more 
compelling in the criminal trial context since usually a 
defendant's confrontation and compulsory process 
rights are at stake when any privilege against testifying 
is asserted. 
Shield Laws 
State shield laws provide the media with the best 
protection from the forced disclosure of information 
acquired through newsgathering. Of the twenty-s!x 
state privileges, only Michigan's cannot be asserted In 
a criminal trial. But beyond this similarity, the other 
twenty-five statutes differ widely in their language and 
in the scope of their coverage. 
Shield laws have been drafted using one of two 
different means for providing the privilege. The 
majority state that no rep.orter sh~l1 be compelle~ to 
disclose information obtained during newsgatherIng. 
The minority, which includes California and New 
York, have statutes which state that no reporter shall be 
held in contempt for refusing to testify. The difference 
in wording has proved extremely important in the 
courts. Courts in the minority group have used a 
separation of powers approach to entirel~ c~rcumv~nt 
the privilege in a number of cases. The majority versIOn 
has been immune to such attack, but is vulnerable on 
other grounds. Courts in these states have utilized the 
sixth amendment or the narrow construction of specific 
passages of the statute to avoid the privilege. But the 
majority version has been more resilient to attack. 
In order to analyze the different types of shield 
statutes and their interpretations in the courtroom, the 
privileges of four states - New Jersey an~ M~ryland 
from the majority group, New York and CalIfornia from 
the minority group - were selected for close scrutiny. 
The four laws were selected because the statutes and 
their interpretations fairly represent most of the 
variations available among - the nation's privileges. 
They were also chosen because of the reported material 
available from the four states. 
New Jersey 
New Jersey had what many people conside«td the 
nation's strongest shield law until In re Farber~ perhaps 
the most important case in this area since Bronzburg. 
Now the law has been amended to conform to the New 
Jersey Supreme Court decision. The privilege was 
reduced from an absolute to a qualified protection for 
newsmen. 
The New Jersey shield law was enacted in 1933, and 
underwent a liberalization in 1977. The privilege 
extended to all persons engaged in some aspect of 
distributing information for the news media, which 
included everything from weeklies and press 
associations' to "other similar printed, photographic, 
mechanical or electric means of disseminating news to 
the general public." The privilege covered both the 
source and the information, and both these terms were 
given broad definitions within the statute. The 
information did not have to be published to be 
protected. Finally, the privilege could be asserted in 
any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or investigative 
body. The New Jersey legislature through its 1977 
amendment of the statute, had fashiond the most 
progressive privilege in the country. 
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But signs that the absolute status ofthe privilege was 
not recognized in the state's court appeared quickly. 
Barely two months after the 1977 amendments became 
effective, a state Superior Court interpreted the statute 
narrowly in rejecting a broad privilege.6 The court 
ruled that a newsman's taped conversation with an 
alleged murdersT, part of which was published, was 
not protected from discovery by the prosecutor. 
Relying largely on United States v. Nixon the c~urt 
found that the state interest in obtaining evidence In a 
criminal trial outweighs the privilege. The court states 
that since the source was no longer confidential there 
could be no "chilling" effect. The court also found a 
waiver of the privilege because a portion of the 
inerview appeared in the Hackensack Sunday Record. 
The New Jersey court applied a balancing test to the 
broad legislative pronouncement with the scales 
heavily tilted in the state's favor. In addition, the court 
infused a very broad waiver concept into the privilege. 
The statute did not mention waiver within its 
provisions. 
Within a year after this first decision the New Jersey 
shield law suffered its total demise. The state's highest 
court declared the law unconstitutional under the 
confrontation clauses of the Unied States and New 
Jersey constitutions. 7 The case arose when Myron A. 
Farber, a reporter for the New York Times, undertook a 
four-month investigation into a ten-year-old unsolved 
mystery, the suspicious deaths of thirteen persons at a 
small hospital in Oradell, New Jersey. The results of 
this effort appeared in the Times. Four months later, in 
May 1976, a grand jury indicted Dr. Mario E. 
Jascelevich, former chief of surgery at the hospital. 
charging him with five counts of murder by poisoning. 
The grand jury did not call Farber as a witness. 
At trial the defense counsel subpoenaed Farber. He 
appeared' and testified abou't the access the state had 
given him to its records during his investigation. He 
declined, however, to speak about how he had obtained 
a copy of a previously missing deposition of Dr. 
Jascalevich claiming a privilege from testifying. 
Next the defense demanded inspection of everythin.; 
Farber had compiffid in the course of his investigation, 
arguing Jascalevich would be deprived of his sixth 
amendment right to compel testimony and confront his 
accusers if Farber was adjudged privileged. The trial 
court accepted the defense arguments and issued broad 
subpoenas. In addition, the court refused to hear 
arguments by the reporter and his newspaper ?n the 
merits of a motion to quash the subpo.enas until they 
turned over all of Farber's material for an in camero 
inspection. When Farber refused to comply with the 
subpoenas the Bergen County Superior Court found 
them guilty of criminal and civil contempt. Farber was 
jailed until he agreed to comply with the order. 8 
The United States Suprllme Court refused to hear the 
dispute,9 but on August 30, Farber's twenty-seventh 
day in jail, the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed to 
hear the case. The state's highest court upheld both the 
criminal and civil contempt judgments against Farber 
and the New York Times. Here we can only focus on 
the parts of the opinion dealing with the state's shield 
law. 
The Court acknowledged that the privilege which 
Farber asserted was, "as strongly worded as any in the 
country," and that the legislature clearly intended to 
extend the press a broad privilege, but that the shield 
law had to be examined in light of the sixth 
amendment to the Constitution and article 1, paragraph 
10 of the New Jersey Constitution. The court easily 
resolved the conflict between the reporter's statutory 
privilege and the defendant's right to evidence in favor 
of the latter. The court interpreted article 1, paragraph 
10, of the state constitution - which uses the exact same 
language as the Constitution's confrontation and com-
pulsory process clauses - as "affording a defendant in a 
criminal prosecution the right to compel the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of 
documents and other material for which he may have, 
or may believe he has, a legitimate need in preparing or 
undertaking his defense." The majority did not attempt 
to resolve the conflict created between the defendant's 
rights and other statutory testimonial privileges. 
The court ruled that although a full hearing on the 
issues or relevancy, materiality, and overbreadth of the 
subpoena should be granted, the Times and Farber had 
"aborted" it by refusing to submit the materials for in 
camera inspection. The majority viewed such an 
inspection as merely a procedural tool to ascertain 
relevancy and materiality, and not in itself an invasion 
of privacy. The court did acknowledge that the party 
opposing the subpoena ought to be . afforded a 
preliminary determination before being compelled to 
submit the subpoenaed information. To meet this 
threshold standard the defendant seeking disclosure 
must show," by a fair preponderance of the evidence 
including all reasonable inferences that he has met the 
requirement of a three-part test derived from Justice 
Stewart's dissent in Branzburg.lo The court emphasiz-
ed that this was 11,0t, "a license for fishing expeditions." 
But it concluded that in this case there was sufficient 
evidence presented by the defendant to mellt this 
three-part test. 
Farber turned what had once been considered a fairly 
absolute privilege into a qualified protection for 
newsmen based on a balancing test - a three-part 
threshold determination of whether the need for the 
evidence overcomes the privilege. Many commentators 
argue that the Branzburg Court had such an approach 
in mind when it noted that state shield laws had to be 
written within constitutional bounds. 
Unfortunately for Farber and the Times the court 
really avoided using the formula it set up. It decided 
primarily on a waiver theory that no preliminary 
hearing was necessary in this case until the material 
was turned over to the trial judge for in camera inspec-
tion. The threshold test, as had been the words of the 
shield law, could be ignored. 
The New Jersey legislature reacted to the Farber 
decision early last year when it amended the statutory 
privilege to conform to the opinion. The statute 
requires that a party seeking enforcement of the 
subpoena must show by a preponderance of the 
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evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the 
materials sought are material and relevant, that they 
cannot be secured through any less intrusive source, 
and that the value of the material sought outweighs the 
privilege. A trial court may rule on these questions 
only after a hearing and it must make specific findings 
of fact and conclusions of law with respect to its ruling. 
The legislature also wrote a waiver provision into the 
amended statute. 
This new privilege received an immediate test. II A 
trial court had ordered Robin Goldstein, a reporter, to 
produce a letter sent to her by a prospective 
prosecution witness for in camera inspection. 
Goldstein based her refusal to testify on the 1980 law. 
The trial judge denied the reporter a hearing on the 
threshold issue. The state supreme court ruled that the 
trial court had misapplied the new law. The court 
found that the defendant had not shown that the 
information was not available through a less intrusive 
source. Here, the court pointed out, the witness was a 
potential source of the relevant and material testimonv. 
Perhaps most importantly as far as the new privilege 
was concerned, the court pronounced that forced 
disclosure to a judge prior to a hearing was a violation 
of freedom of the press and impermissible. 
After this ruling the trial judge again ordered the 
reporter to testify. The New Jersey Supreme Court 
reversed the judge's order, again on the ground that 
less.intrusive sources could provide the defendant with 
the information he sought from the reporter. The de-
fense tried to revive a broad waiver theory, but the 
court was not dissuaded by the fact that the source of 
the information was not confidential. The privilege to 
withhold information granted by the shield law. the 
court stated, "is that of the newsperson and not the 
source." 
New Jersey's statutory privilege for newsmen has 
traveled a rocky road since 1977. The amendment of 
that year made it perhaps the broadest privilege in the 
country. The courts sharply limited the privilege 
through the narrow interpretation of the statute and the 
use of a balancing test which appeared heavily tilted in 
favor of disclosure, either because of the state's interest 
in investigating and prosecuting criminal activity or 
the defendant's consitutional rights of confrontation 
and compulsory process. The shield law's 1980 version 
may offer a workable compromise. Under the statute 
the court must provide the subpoenaed reporter with a 
hearing in which the party seeking disclosure must 
meet a three-part threshold test. Once the party seeking 
disclosure produces a preponderance of the evidence 
on the three questions the reporter must forward the 
subpoenaed material to the court for in camera 
inspection. The latest court decision indicates the 
state's judiciary may work with, rather than against. 
this version of the privilege. This case indicates that 
the requirement of a hearing will be strictly applied 
and that at such a hearing the party seeking disclosure 
must present more than a simple allegation to meet the 
standard for overriding the privilege. If the state's 
courts adhere to this approach newsmen may receive 
the protection of the statutory privilege unless the 
defendant's sixth amendment rights are in jeopardy, a 
point at which even the New York Times has conceded 
the privilege must yield. 
Maryland 
This state's statute is much more limited in its 
coverage than the New Jersey law. In Maryland, only 
persons engaged, connected, or employed with a 
newsp~per, journal, radio, or television may assert the 
statutory privilege. In addition, the privilege extends 
only to the source, not to the information itself. Finally, 
the information has to be obtained for the purpose of 
publication or dissemination in order for any privilege 
to exist. 
The major shield law case in the Maryland courts has 
been Ughtman v. Maryland,l2 decided in 1972. A 
reporter for the Baltimore Evening Sun was sununoned 
to testify before a grand juryl3 to testify about his 
knowledge of suspected illegal drug traffic in Ocean 
City, Maryland. Earlier the reporter had published an 
article in the newspaper on the use of drugs in Ocean 
City, and in it he described in detail an incident which 
occurred in one of the city's head shops. The grand jury 
asked the reporter for the location of the shop and a 
description of the shopkeeper. The reporter refused to 
answer on·the basis of Maryland's statutory privilege. 
He claimed that the shopkeeper was his source and that 
describing the location would in all probability lead to 
disclosure of the souce. After a hearing the trial court 
found the reporter in civil contempt, noting that there 
was no evidence that the shopkeeper knew that he was 
dealing with a reporter. The trial court determined that 
the shopkeeper was not a source within the meaning of 
the statute. 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, while 
acknowledging that the statute was absolute within the 
sphere of its coverage, affirmed the contempt citation. 
The court ruled that the privilege encompassed any 
source of news or information without regard to 
whether the source gave his information in confidence. 
In addition, disclosure of the source couid not be 
accomplishe~ by requiring the reporter to answer 
questions· aimed, directly, or indirectly, toward 
ascertaining the source's identity. Finally, the court 
recognized that the privilege was vested in the 
reporter, not the source. 
But as the New Jersey court did in Farber, the 
Maryland court in Ughtman ignored its broad legal 
pronouncements on the statutory privilege, and 
decided the· case on much narrower grounds. Here the 
court ruled no privilege could be claimed: 
Where a newsman, by dint of his own investigative efforts, 
personally observes conduct constituting the conunission of 
criminal activities by persons at a particular location, the 
newsman. and not the persons observed. is the "source" of the 
news or information in the sense contemplated by the statute. 
The court stated that to rule otherwise would insulate 
the information itself from disclosure, a result at odds 
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with a strict construction of the statute. 
Since Ughtman the state's shield law has not 
undergone much litigation. In 1979 the court's 
statutory analysis in Lightman was applied to criminal 
and civil trials. 14 In addition the court reaffirmed that 
confidentiality between reporter and source was not a 
major factor in determining the existence of the 
privilege. The state's attorney general;s office also 
offered a narrow interpretation of the Maryland shield 
law. It issued an opinion in 1978 which indicated that 
the privilege was limited to the sources of information 
which was actually published or disseminated. 15 
The New Jersey and Maryland privileges are quite 
distinct from one another. While the New Jersey shield 
law covers a broad spectrum of activities within its 
purview, its application in every case remains subject 
to a balancing test. In Maryland the privilege is much 
more limited in scope, covering just major media 
organizations and only the source of the information, 
but this protection is considered absolute. Only further 
litigation in each state will determine which approach 
offers journalists the greatest protection. 
New York 
The New York privilege was enacted into law in 
1970 and was amended once, in 1975, to include grand 
juries. Although the statute was originally considered a 
fairly strong privilege for newsmen, the New York 
courts, construing the terms of the law narrowly, have 
severely limited the protection, both in scope and in 
application. 
The New York shield law grants a protection to 
professional journalists and newscasters from con· 
tempt citations for refusing to disclose any news or the 
source of such news. The information to be protected 
must be obtained in the course of gathering news for 
publication by the organization which employs the 
reporter. The statute's definition of a professional 
journalist is not as expansive as that of New Jersey's 
law, but not as narrow as many others. The definition 
of newscaster is quite broad; it includes anyone 
engaged in analyzing and commenting on news. The 
media groups within the purview of the privilege are 
specifically defined, especially with regards to which 
newspapers' reporters may assert the privilege. Thus 
the scope of the New York privilege is somewhat 
narrower than a majority of the other privileges. 
The decision that set the tempo for judicial 
consideration of New York's shield law was Wolf v. 
People16 decided in 1972. In that case the Village Voice 
was held in contempt for refusing to comply with a 
subpoena which ordered the newspaper to produce the 
original manuscript of a "confession" it received from 
a prisoner, the defendant in a criminal action for 
kidnapping and coercion arising out of a prison riot in 
the Tombs, a New York City jail. The Voice based its 
refusal to comply with the order on the state's shield 
law, arguing that the manuscript fell within a broad 
interpretation of "news". But a state appeals court 
(Continued on page 28) 
Deep Seabed Resources -
Who Has The Right To Exploit Them 
By Ray W. King 
In 1872 the British Oceanographic Ship HMS 
Challenger discovered manganese nodules on the deep 
ocean seabed. Manganese nodules contain manganese, 
copper, nickel, and cobalt and lie just below or on the 
surface of the deep ocean seabed at depths of about 
three miles. Most are found in waters beyond the 
jurisdiction of any state. The Pacific Ocean may 
contain up to 1,500,000,000,000 tons of manganese 
nodules with 10,000,000 tons being added each year by 
chemical and biological processes--enough to meet 
estimated global demand for the metals for many years. 
Development of this resource came to serious 
consideration in the 1960's. At present, only a few 
nations are sufficiently advanced technologically to 
have the potential capability to exploit the deep 
seabed, and at best they are ten years away from 
commercial exploitation. 
When the Challenger discovered the manganese 
nodules there was no doubt that the doctrine of res 
nullius applied to them: the resources of the seabed 
belonged to no one and whatever was recovered was 
subject to national appropriation. Since that time the 
status of the international law governing the deep 
seabed and its resources was recognized, a consensus 
began to develop in the international community that 
the deep seabed and its resources should be subject to a 
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not subject to national appropriation. The belief was 
that the world community should share the resources 
and the profits derived from their exploitation. At the 
same time, the estimated costs for making a mine site 
commerically productive began to soar. Initial research 
at a site could cost $150,000,000 and the cost to make it 
productive could range from $500.000.000 to as much 
as $1,000,000,000. Naturally, the mining industry 
began to look for ways to protect its investment. 
The controversy as to which policy should control 
the taking of the minerals from the deep seabed has 
recently come to a head and, as yet, is unresolved. The 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
has recently completed drafting a proposed Law of the 
Sea Treaty which strongly reflects the res communis 
concept. At almost the opposite extreme, the United 
States enacted the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals 
Resources Act which protects the national interest and 
reflects the res nullius approach as to minerals 
recovered. This article will briefly explore how the 
concept that the deep ocean seabed belongs to 
everybody relates to the proposed Law of the Sea 
Treaty and the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources 
Act and the continuing tension between supporting the 
concept and wanting to protect national and industrial 
interests. 
The concept that the deep ocean seabed belongs to 
everybody was first proposed to the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1967 by Ambassador Arvid Pardo 
of Malta. He suggested that the resources of the deep 
seabed be regarded as the common heritage of mankind 
and exploitation be conducted only by or under the 
management of an international organization. The 
United Nations was quick to approve the concept and 
included it in General Assembly Resolution 2467 
(XXIII). of 1968, U.N. DOC. A17477 (1968). The 
resolution called for exploitation of the deep seabed to 
be carried out for the "benefit of mankind as a whole." 
Over the next several years, the United Nations passed 
several resolutions endorsing the concept, among the 
most significant being the Moratorium Resohition of 
1969 and the Declaration of Principles of 1970. The 
Moratorium Resolution, Resolution 2544 (XXIV), U.N. 
DOC. A/7630 (1969), restated the benefit of mankind 
theme and declared, first, that pending the 
establishment of an international regime there was a 
ban on all activities of exploitation of the deep seabed, 
second, it was declared that no claims to any part of the 
deep seabed or its resources would be recognized. The 
Declaration of Principles, Resolution 2749 (XXV), U.N. 
DOC. A/8028 (1970), declared the deep seabed and 
resources that lay beyond any national jurisdiction to 
be the "common heritage of mankind" and not subject 
to appropriation. The Declaration of Principles and 
subsequent General Assembly resolutions called for the 
establishment of an international regime to control the 
development of the deep ocean seabed. When the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
convened, the establishment of such an international 
organization was on the agenda. 
The United States was one of the prime motivators 
behind the common heritage of mankind concept and 
was a strong supporter of the Declaration of Principles. 
When the Declaration of Principles was before the 
General Assembly, there was no controversy surround-
ing support for the general concept and it passed with-
out a single negative vote. The United States, however, 
did strongly oppose the moratorium provisions of the 
Moratorium Resolution and made it clear that the 
United States did not consider itself bound by the reso-
lution. 
During this time, the mining industry was becoming 
increasingly concerned about protecting its invest-
ment. In 1974 Deepsea Ventures, Inc., a United States 
corporation, took a dramatic step toward this end. It 
attempted to establish a right to a manganese nodule 
mine site in the Pacific Ocean seabed. In a letter to 
Secretary of State Kissinger, Deepsea Ventures gave 
notice of its intent to assert an exclusive right to 
evaluate, develop, and mine the manganese nodules in 
a 60,000 square kilometer area. The letter asked all 
entities to respect the exclusive right Deepsea Ventures 
was claiming; however, Deepsea Ventures did 
maintain that it was not asserting any territorial claim. 
The Department of State responded by stating that it 
did not grant or recognize exclusive rights to the deep 
ocean seabed and the Third L'nited Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea was the appropriate vehicle for 
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developing the law in this area. 
At the close of the ninth session of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea the 
participants had negotiated a draft of a comprehensive 
treaty dealing with the law of the sea. Part XI of the 
proposed treaty addresses the "Area"--the seabed and 
ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction. When dealing with the deep 
seabed the Conference was governed by the principle 
that the Area and its resources are the common heritage 
of mankind and all activities in the Area are to be 
conducted for the benefit of mankind as a whole. An 
International Sea-Bed Authority is established to 
control all activities in the Area. All states parties are 
members of the Authority and the Assembly, one of the 
principal organs of the Authority. Much of the actual 
regulation will be administered by another organ of the 
Authority, the Council. Seats on the Council are 
apportioned to assure that groups of states with special 
interests are represented. The Authority, through 
another of its organs, the Enterprise, is empowered to 
carry out activities in the Area directly, including the 
processing and marketing of minerals recovered. 
The treaty establishes policies relating to activities in 
the Area and sets up a system for regulating those 
activities. In general the treaty provides: 
* Activities in the area can only be conducted 
pursuant to an approved plan. 
* The Authority is the only entity that can grant 
rights in the Area and it will issue licenses for 
exploration and permits for exploitation. 
* Production ceilings are established to control the 
depletion of resources and regulate the market. 
* Those exploiting the deep seabed will transfer 
their technology to the Authority and developing 
states. 
* Those exploiting the deep seabed will share their 
profits with the Authority. 
The mining industry in the United States 
vehemently opposes the proposed Law of the Sea 
Treaty. The industry believes that the provisions of the 
treaty are such that should it ever go into effect all 
incentive to commercially invest in deep seabed 
mining will be eliminated. The mining industry'S 
objections to the treaty represent a partisan position but 
they do have some substance and merit attention. First, 
since the treaty does not contain a clause assuring the 
recognition of interests already engaged in deep sea 
mining, it does not adequately protect investments 
made before the treaty takes effect. The industry 
contends that there is no incentive to make large 
capital investments now, when whatever advantage a 
company gains may be taken away when the treatv 
goes into force. Second, under the treaty there is n~ 
guaranteed access to the manganese nodules. The 
mining industry believes that it is essential to the 
United States' security needs. and of course its own 
economic needs, to have a guaranteed access to the 
minerals. Access to the deep seabed is to be granted by 
the Authority through the Council. United States 
access to the deep seabed appears rather dim when one 
considers that the Council can be controlled by the 
developing and Eastern Socialist nations. Third. the 
mining industry believes that the transfer of 
technology and sharing of profits requirements of the 
treaty mean that it will be supporting and funding a 
?Iajor competito~, the Enterprise. Lastly. the treaty 
Imposes production ceilings thus limiting the profit 
the mining companies could make and further 
redUcing the incentive to invest in deep seabed mining. 
On June 28. 1980. President Carter signed the Deep 
Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act. 94 Stat. 553. The 
stated purpose of the Act is to encourage the successful 
negotiation of a law of the sea treaty and to establish an 
interim program to encourage and regulate the 
development df mineral resources of the deep seabed. 
The Act establishes a system for allocating access to the 
minerals of the deep seabed among United States 
citizens and reciprocating states and sets up a 
regulatory framework. The basic provisions provide: 
* A United States citizen may not engage in activity 
in the deep seabed without receiving authority to 
do so by being issued a license or permit under 
the Act. from a reciprocating state. or under an in-
ternational agreement. 
* The authorizations issued are exclusive. 
* When nationals of other states interfere with 
activities being conducted pursuant to an 
authorization under the Act. the Secretary of 
State shall use all peaceful means to resolve the 
controversy. 
* The removal of nodules from the deep seabed is 
taxed with the revenues going to a revenue 
sharing trust fund which will be available to 
Congress to make contributions under an inter-
national deep seabed treaty. 
* No license or permit will be issued that will inter-
fere with a similar authorization issued by a 
reciprocating state. 
* Congress intends that any international agree-
ment to which the United States becomes a party 
shall recognize the rights of United States 
citizens who have engaged in activities under the 
Act and provide security to those rights. 
The United States mining industry supported the 
Act and believes it provides the security necessary to 
encouage investment in deep seabed mining. The Act 
pays rhetorical deference to the common heritage of 
mankind concept but. except for the tax and revenue 
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sharing trust fund. the provisions represent the interest 
of the mining industry. When the House of 
Representatives was considering the Act it concluded 
that the doctrine of res nullius applied to the resources 
recovered. and the activities conducted under the 
authority of the Act were permissible until a law of the 
sea treaty takes effect and changes the doctrine. 
Whe~ Con?ress passed the Act it was considering 
the natIonal mterest as well as the mining industry's 
concerns. Manganese. copper, nickel. and cobalt have 
been identified as materials critical to the national 
interest. They are metals important to the industrial 
and military needs of the country and it is essential that 
the United States have a secure supply to avoid 
dependence on foreign sources in times of national 
emergency. In passing the Act. Congress was recogniz-
ing that there was a need to secure a supply of these 
metals and that such a supply can be obtained from the 
deep seabed. 
The controversy as to which policy will control the 
taking of minerals from the deep seabed can be 
distilled down to a conflict between the national 
legislation and the international "legislation." The 
common heritage of mankind concept is obviously 
more favorable to the international community as a 
whole; the continuation of the res nuJlius doctrine as to 
the resources themselves is best when there are specific 
national interests to be served. At the present stage of 
the controversy, it is highly problematic that the 
United States will ratify the provisions of the proposed 
Law of the Sea Treaty that relate to deep seabed min-
ing. Although the United States has endorsed the com-
mon heritage of mankind approach, in practical appli-
cation it has favored continuance of traditional doc-
trines. The United States probably will not find any 
agreement acceptable until there are reasonable assur-
ances of access to the resources and some security is 
provided the investments made by the industry. The 
practical effect of the United States refusing to ratify 
the provisions of the Law of the Sea Treaty relating to 
deep seabed mining could be relegation of the common 
heritage of mankind ideal to the international archives. 
Note: As of this printing, the Reagan administration 
has decided to block early completion of the Law 
of the Sea Treaty. 
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Constitutional Amendments That Never Were 
By Jon Bradley King 
The minute globe we inhabit has been partitioned by 
the forces of language, religion and war into almost 170 
?atio?-states. These sovereign entities, varying widely 
In Size, strength and political system share one 
common characteristic: each has a body of laws and 
customs reflecting the collective perception of its 
citizenry regarding the proper attributes of their 
government, in short, a "constitution." In some states, 
such as Great Britain and Saudi Arabia, the 
fundamental law is not contained in a single written 
text. In other nations, China for example, the 
constitution is a veritable laundry list specifying in 
wearisome detail precisely what the state is 
empowered to do. While some countries revere their 
constitutions and view alterations of the basic law with 
great hesitancy, other states, such as strife-torn Bolivia, 
have seen one military strongman after another 
proclaim "constitutions" which endure precisely as 
long as the current incumbent maintains his precarious 
grasp on the presidential chair. 
In all nations change is a constant. The Brazilians 
and the Beninese, the Swiss and the Sudanese have 
each seen fit to alter their constitutions to reflect their 
changing conceptions of justice and political necessity. 
If a nation is prone to political upheaval, the internal 
mechanism set forth in a constitution for the 
modification of its provisions may never be utilized. 
However, if a constitution endures for a generation or 
more the unexpected ambiguities in its text or the 
changing views of the population will result in calls for 
constitutional amendment. 
Our federal con.~titution emerged from the 
Philadelphia Convention of 1787 which assembled 
with a mandate to amend the flawed Articles of 
Confederation. In the nearly two centuries since the 
product of that gathering entered into effect, the 
demand for alterations in the Constitution has been 
constant. In twenty-six instances we have concluded 
that changing our nation's basic law was desirable, if 
not imperative. The Bill of Rights, the Reconstruction 
Amendments, Income Tax, Prohibition, Presidential 
Succession and the Eighteen-Year Old Vote chronicle 
our country's evolution toward a "more perfect union." 
Yet for every amendment ultimately adopted, 
hundreds have fallen upon infertile ground. Scores 
have been consigned to the tender mercies of hostile 
committee . chairmen while others, labelled the 
brainchildren of eccentrics, have been given prompt, if 
not decent, burials. Amendments have been offered 
with such diverse goals as prohibiting divorce, 
preventing filibusters in the Senate, limiting 
individual wealth to ten million dollars and banning 
polygamy. 
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However, certain proposals have received the 
requisite two-thirds vote of both the House and Senate, 
yet have failed to win the necessary three-fourths of the 
states to their cause. This article will discuss these 
ill-fated measures: the constitutional amendments that 
never were. 
When the Founding Fathers brought forth their 
work to the waiting world, the result was viewed by 
some with alarm. Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, 
proclaiming that a "coalition of monarchy men . . . 
aristocrats and drones" had authored the document, 
proposed a Bill of Rights as "necessary against the 
encroachments of power upon the indispen~able rights 
of human nature." Several states ratified the proposed 
Constitution only upon the condition that amendments 
be adopted to guarantee the rights of states and the 
people in the new federal government. Alarmed by 
demands for the convening of a new constitutional 
convention. Rep. James Madison fulfilled the promises 
made by his fellow Federalists during the ratification 
campaign by introducing twelve proposed amend-
ments to the constitution. The ten finally adopted, 
better known provisions guaranteeing freedom of 
speech and worship and the right to a jury trial, among 
others, were well-received by most state legislatures. 
Virginia's ratification of the Bill of Rights in December 
1791, a contribution to the cause of civil liberty 
. perhaps unsurpassed in the history of the 
Commonwealth, brought the measures into effect. In 
contrast. Connecticut, Georgia and Massachusetts 
dawdled until 1939 before cautiously boarding the 
ratification bandwagon. 
"The Lightning Speed of Honesty" 
Two of Madison's proposals failed to obtain 
admission to the constitutional pantheon. The first 
dealt with the apportionment of the House of 
Representatives. The sole provision in the original 
document on that subject was the "3/5 compromise" 
under which 3/5 of "all other persons" i.e., slaves, were 
to be included in the census totals utilized to apportion 
the House. Some states, however, were hesitant to 
allow Congress to set the ratio between Representatives 
and the citizenry and urged that the formula of one 
Congressman for every 30,000 persons be set forth in 
the Constitution as well. After a series of tedious 
debates which featured proposals to prevent the size of 
the House from falling below 175 members, the 
Congress submitted to the states an amendment read-
ing: 
After the first enumeration, there shall be one representative for 
every thirty thousand until the number shall amount to one 
hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by 
Congress that there shall not be less than two hundred representa· 
tives nor more than one representative for every fifty thousand 
persons." 
The apportionment amendment came within a single 
state of meeting the 3/4 ratification requirement. 
Although only one state actually rejected the measure, 
four states including the amendment's erstwhile 
supporter, Massachusetts, failed to even consider it. 
Historians have generally viewed the defeat of the 
amendment as beneficial due to the undesirable 
rigidity it would have imposed upon representation in 
the House during an era of rapid demographic shifts 
and a burgeoning population. Imagine the glorious 
chaos that might have resulted had the amendment 
been adopted in its original form. The ratio of one 
representative to 30,000 constitutents may conjure up a 
vision of Congressmen more responsive to constituent 
needs and better able to represent the remarkably 
varied American electorate. It should also bring forth 
the nightmarish image of more than 7500 
representatives (to serve the 226 million of us in 1980) 
spilling forth from the Capitol Office Building into the 
streets of Washington in a vain search for a desk or 
parking space with the vague hope of introducing some 
legislation should they ever have the opportunity. to 
visit the floor of the House. It seems likely that when 
the Framers voiced concern regarding "mob rule" they 
never entertained the notion that the lower chamber of 
the legislature might meet the criteria for that concept. 
The second amendment offered by Mr. Madison 
would have prohibited members of Congress from 
granting themselves a raise "until an election of 
representatives shall have intervened." Since the first 
Congress provided only a modest per diem allowance 
for its members, the need for this amendment was 
dubious. Nonetheless, six states saw fit to ratify it while 
five rejected it. The issue died down until 1816 when 
the House voted itself the luxury of an annual salary. 
The response from the electorate was a Nixonian 
firestorm. Those representatives who dared seek 
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reelection were lucky to escape the tar and feather. 
Henry Clay himself waged a battle for his political life 
by admitting that he supported the measure. Since that 
era, the experience of Congressmen indicates that 
many would be quite content if the inconvenient 
matter of salaries was settled by a constitutional pro-
vision taking into account the vagaries of constituent 
pressure and the ravages of inflation. 
The next abortive addition to our Constitutional 
scheme sprang from the meteoric career of Napoleon 
Bonaparte. In 1799 the Corsican corporal ousted the 
Directory, a band of lawyers whose shortcomings 
would likely have defied the descriptive power of our 
current Chief Justice. Firmly in control of France, 
Bonaparte embarked on a campaign of conquest that 
radically altered the face of Europe. Dynasties which 
had reigned for centuries and an Empire which had 
endured for a millenium tottered and fell within a 
decade. In 1804, after a series of assassination attempts 
had forcefully reminded him of his own mortality, 
Napoleon adopted the hereditary principle and 
proclaimed himself Emperor. Since an empire requires 
a nobility, the accession of the corporal to the throne 
mandated the elevation of his friends and relatives to 
lofty positions. In addition, Napoleon instituted the 
LElgion of Honor to reward valor. Soon a new nobility 
had been established atop the ruins of the Bourbon 
monarchies. 
At this juncture, love and money entered. Finance 
had proven a problem for American negotiators at the 
French court, principally due to their failure to grasp 
its essential function in the diplomacy of the 
Napoleonic era. A conversation between Livingston, 
the American ambassador to France, and Talleyrand, 
Napoleon's foreign minister, will illustrate: 
Livingston: "Can we sign a commercial treaty with you T' 
Talleyrand: "Have you money?" 
Livingston: "Money? But ... but" (sputtering) 
Talleyrand: "The point is, do you have a lot of money? You see. 
in my counlry it's very hard to do business. It takes a lot of monel'. 
bUI if you have it. Ihere are no problems thaI can'l be ironed out. 
Think aboul it." 
(from Jean Orieux's TaJleyrond) 
Livingston thought about it. Talleyrand got the money 
and we got a treaty. Nonethless, there was growing 
concern that when the representatives of our agrarian 
republic went abroad, they might prove particularly 
susceptible to gifts of appreciation from European 
governments occasioned by their cooperative behavior. 
Romance, not money or power, ruled the heart of 
Napoleon's brother, Jerome. At the height of imperial 
grandeur, he forfeited his opportunity for elevation to a 
throne by fleeing to America where he married a 
Maryland lady of aristocratic d~scent. His presence in 
this country, aided by a series of bizarre political 
machinations, led to the anti-nobility amendment. 
The Federalist party, out of power since their 
disastrous defeat in the election of 1800, sought to 
smear the Jeffersonian Republicans by alleging that the 
government was unduly sympathetic to French foreign 
policy. The Federalist hoped that by introducing an 
anti-nobility amendment they would arouse Republi-
can opposition which they could then exploit by 
publicizing their opponents' ties to the Bonapartes. 
The concern that American diplomats might be 
corrupted while abroad and the xenophobia present 
during the period preceding the War of 1812 
encouraged their design. 
In 1810, Senator Reed of Maryland introduced the 
anti-nobility amendment. The measure was to 
supplement a clause in the original Constitution (Art. I, 
sec. 9, cl. 7) which prohibits officials from accepting 
titles or gifts from foreign governments without the 
consent of Congress. As passed, the amendment read: 
If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive, or 
retain any title of nobility or honor, or shall. without the consent of 
Congress, accept or retain any present, pension. office or 
emouhnent of any kind whatever from any emperor, king, prince. 
or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the 
United States and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust 
or profit under either of them." 
The Jeffersonians failed to take the bait. Viewing the 
amendment as harmless, they supported it. Several 
states quickly ratified the proposal, which soon was but 
one state short of meeting the 3/4 requirement. 
The final chapter of this amendment's history is 
fully in keeping with its convoluted origin. The South 
Carolina Senate ratified the amendment and sent it to 
the lower chamber for a vote. Had the South Carolina 
House adopted it, the anti-nobility amendment would 
have been enshrined in our Constitution. Instead, it 
was misplaced. The federal government, believing the 
ratification process complete, included it in the official 
copy of the Constitution distributed to the 15th 
Congress. Although the error was detected after some 
investigation, the damage was done. It was printed in 
several popular textbooks and, as a result, two 
generations of American schoolchildren were taught 
that the anti-nobility amendment had been incorpo-
rated into our fundamental law. 
As for Jerome Bonaparte: he abandoned his 
American wife and· returned to aid Napoleon at the 
Battle of Waterloo, thus demonstrating his exquisitely 
bad sense of timing. His wife died in a Baltimore 
poorhouse in her 90's. Talleyrand died full of wealth 
and honors. C'est la vie. 
In 1860 America was tottering on the verge of civil 
war. A series of secret conferences was held in the 
interim between Abraham Lincoln's election and 
inauguration in the vain hope of preventing secession 
and armed conflict. The product of these furtive 
attempts at compromise was a series of proposed 
constitutional amendments designed to reassure the 
Southern states that a Republican federal government 
would not pose a threat to the status quo. 
One particularly curious amendment was proposed 
by Rep. Clement Vallandigham of Ohio, who urged that 
the nation be divided into four regions: North, South, 
West and Pacific. Under his measure, each region 
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could have vetoed the election of an individual to the 
Presidency or any piece of legislation antithetical to its 
interests. 
The ultimate fate of Congressman Vallandigham may 
be worthy of reflection. In 1885, Vallandigham, then a 
private citizen and practiCing attorney, was defe?di~g 
a client charged with murder. He planned to mamtam 
in his closing argument to the jury that had his client 
handled the pistol in the manner alleged by the 
prosecution, his client would have undoubtedly shot 
himself not the murder victim. In a rehearsal the night 
before his scheduled address to the jury, Vallandigham 
used a loaded gun and produced dramatic, albeit 
tragic, evidence to support his assertion. 
The lame duck session of Congress which convened 
in December 1860 witnessed a series of attempts to halt 
the plunge toward war. Representatives from the 
Border States, who were particularly concerned that 
their homes might serve as battlegrounds, introduced a 
series of proposed statutes and constitutional amend-
Talleyrand 
ments designed to produce a compromise between 
North and South. Most of these measures sought to 
clarify the federal government's power to regulate 
slavery or the rights of states to leave the Union. 
In February 1861. Representative Corwin introduced 
a constitutional amendment which would have 
prevented any attempt to abolish slavery in the 
Southern states. It read: 
No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will 
authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or to iqterfere 
within any state with the domestic institutions thereof. including 
that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said state." 
The House passed the measure on February 28. 1861. 
When the Corwin amendment was introduced in the 
Senate. one Northern member sought to add a clause 
denying the right of secession. The alteration was 
defeated and on March 2. the Corwin amendment 
passed the Senate with precisely 2/3 of its members in 
support. 
The legislatures of Ohio and Maryland ratified the 
amendment. Illinois adopted it by way of convention. 
the first state to employ this method of ratification. 
However. the New England states resoundingly 
rejected it. thus sealing the amendment's fate. The 
shelling of Fort Sumter in April 1861 reduced the 
hopes of compromise to ashes. and slavery perished in 
the conflagration of civil war. 
In the "Gilded Age" following the Civil War, 
America lost its exclusively agrarian character and 
launched the beginnings of its Industrial Revolution. 
By the turn of the century, industrial centers had 
sprung up throughout the Northeast and Midwest. 
Relying on a huge pool of cheap labor composed 
primarily of newly arrived immigrants from the 
Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, the owners of 
factories reaped tremendous profits. 
The Progressive movement sought to halt the abuse 
of labor and the pervasive political corruption which 
resulted when private fortunes bought their way into 
government. A series of constitutional amendments 
were adopted due to the efforts of these refonners; the 
income tax, the popular election of Senators. and 
women's suffrage are the legacy of the Progressives. 
However, the reformers of that era failed when they 
sought to bring the amending process to bear against 
the evil of child labor. 
As early as 1906, measures had been introduced in 
Congress to prohibit the use of minors in the work 
force. Horrified by testimony that 1/3 of all children 
between the ages of ten and thirteen were employed in 
sweatshops. working long hours for a pittance. Con-
gress first sought to address the problem via the Child 
Labor Act of 1916. Under this statute. interstate and 
foreign commerce were closed to the products of child 
labor. 
One day before the Act entered into effect. a U.S. 
District judge in North Carolina granted a request for an 
injunction to prevent the enforcement of the Child 
Labor law. When the case reached the Supreme Court 
as Hammer v. Dagenhart. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) the law 
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was struck down as beyond the congressional grant of 
power under the commerce clause. 
Frustrated in its initial effort. Congress attempted to 
evade the Court's pronouncement by attacking child 
labor under the taxing power. A statute subjecting the 
profits of industries employing children to a tax was 
enacted in 1919. but in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co .. 
253 U.S. 20 (1921) this measure was struck down as 
well. 
In 1924, the Progressives brought the ultimate 
weapon against child labor to the fore. Rep. Foster of 
Ohio and Sen. Shortridge of California introduced the 
Child Labor Amendment to the Constitution. It read: 
Section 1. The Congress shall h.ve the power to limit. regulate. 
and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age. 
Section 2. The power of the several states is unimpaired by this 
article except that the operation of state laws shall be suspended to 
the extent necessary to give effect to the legislation enacted by 
Congress. 
The amendment's opponents argued that the problem 
of child labor was best left to the states. Alterations in 
the measure to exempt agricultural workers and to 
limit the coverage of the ban to hazardous occupations 
were defeated and, on June 3, 1924. the amendment 
was adopted by Congress. 
In less than a year. a series of crippling defeats in the 
states had ended all hope of ratification. By February 
1925, more than thirteen states had rejected the 
proposal; since it was thereby impossible to secure 
acceptance of the measure by a 3/4 majority of the 
states. the Child Labor Amendment langUished. A 
motion to recall it to Congress was introduced but not 
adopted. 
In 1941, the Supreme Court. its membership altered 
by the appointments of President Franklin Roosevelt, 
overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart in United States v. 
Darby. 312 U.S. 100. The ability of the federal 
government to prohibit child labor under the 
commerce clause was upheld. The adoption of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938 and its ban on the employ-
ment of minors, thus rendered the Child Labor Amend-
ment superfluous. 
The 1960's witnessed another series of constitution-
al amendments on a wide variety of topics; 
presidential voting in Washington, D.C.; the abolition 
of the poll tax; presidential disability; and the 
eighteen-to-twenty-one year old vote. However. the 
wave of reform crested and ebbed in the 1970·s. Two 
constitutional amendments proposed by Congress 
aroused opposition in conservative states. and at this 
writing. have failed to win ratification. 
The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) passed in the 
House and Senate in 1972 without strong opposition; 
within three years 35 of the required 38 states had 
ratified it. At that point, the amendment's progress 
halted. Opposition in the South and Southwestern 
states. grounded on the perceived threat of the ERA to 
"protective" employment and marital legislation 
prevented the measure from winning approval in 
additional state legislatures. Although the ERA came 
within two or three votes of ratification in Florida. 
Georgia and Missouri, and though the deadline for 
state approval was extended to June 1982, it appears all 
but certain that the Equal Rights Amendment will join 
the ranks of the constitutional amendments that failed 
to gamer the necessary support of 3/4 of the states. 
In 1978, Congress adopted an amendment providing 
representation for the District of Columbia. The 
measure was passed over the opposition of those who 
contended that it was contrary to the principle of 
federalism to make the seat of government the equiva-
lent of a state. This amendment read: 
1. For purposes of representation in the Congress. election of the 
. President and Vice-President. and Article V of this mnstitution. 
the District ... shall be treated as though it were a state. 
2. The exercise of the rights and powers conferred under this 
article shall be by the people of the District ... as provided by the 
Congress. 
3. The twenty-third article of amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States is hereby repealed. 
4. This article shall be inoperative, unless it shall have been rati-
fied ... within seven years from the date of its submission." 
By 1981, eight states had ratified the proposal, but 
bickering among District politicians lobbying for its 
adoption, and the success of a referendum proposal 
advocating statehood for the District cast doubt on the 
amendment's prospects. 
The story must not and shall not end here. Each year 
thousands of measures are introduced to alter the text 
comprising our fundamental law; the dreams of 
Burger. 
authorized pilot prorams in representative districts, so 
that possible standards for the federal courts could be 
assessed by evaluating the results from such differing 
requirements as an examination on federal practice 
subjects, a requirement of prior trial experience, and a 
peer review procedure. An Implementation Committee 
on Admission of Attorneys to Federal Practice to 
oversee and monitor these pilot programs was created 
by the Judicial Conference. The Committee Chairman is 
Judge James Lawrence King of the Southern District of 
Florida. 
In the same year, 1979, a Task Force of the Section on 
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the ABA, 
chaired by Dean Roger C. Crampton of Cornell Law 
School, made a series of recommendations including 
that law schools offer instruction in basic litigation 
skills to all students desiring it, and that they make 
more extensive instructional use of experienced and 
able practitioners. 
Chief Justice Burger has expressed concerns about 
law school training in professional responsibility. He 
has asked whether it is "sound educational policy to 
train people first in the skills of a professional 
monopoly and leave it to some vague, undetermined, 
unregulated, undefined future to learn the moral and 
ethical precepts that ought to guide the exercise of such 
an important monopoly?" Law schools cannot make up 
for all shortcomings in early ethical training in the 
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idealistic men are given substance as proposed 
amendments to the Constitution. Most fall victim to 
ideological opposition or to the more pragmatic 
philosophy embodied in the old saw, "If it ain't broke, 
don't fix it." For the few that surmount the hurdles in 
Congress, the state ratification process serves as the 
arena where the measure's opponents can battle against 
adoption in the fifty statehouses across our nation. 
By mandating rigorous requirements for amending 
the constitution, the Framers sought to discourage us 
from altering its provisions in the heat of political 
passion, to the detriment of all. The adoption of a mere 
twenty-six amendments in almost two centuries of 
constitutional government is not merely testimony to 
the wisdom of that cautionary device, but a tribute to a 
citizenry which has come to view the amendment 
process as the appropriate channel for efforts to make 
our Constitution more accurately reflect our 
fundamental values. 
Jon Bradley King is a third year law student from 
Omega, Indiana. In 1978, he received an A.B. in History 
and Political Science from Indiana University. Brad 
studied at University College, Oxford, the following 
summer and was employed by the Legal Foundation 
for Personal Liberties, an activist law firm in San 
Francisco. Mr. King is presently the American Bar 
Association representative at the Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law. 
home, church, or primary and secondary schools. 
Neither can law schools anticipate all of the ethical 
challenges that a career in practice can bring. But, 
according to Burger, they still have a profound 
obligation in the area of professional responsibility 
from the outset of a student's education and 
continuously to sensitize him or her to the ethical 
problems to be encountered in his or her chosen 
profession. 
In the past twelve years there has been considerable 
change in the training of lawyers. Many of these 
changes--the multiplication of clinical programs and 
courses in trial advocacy, rules permitting students to 
practice in court, the development of internship and 
externship programs--have been spurred and sup-
ported by Burger. As the nation's leading jurist, he has 
been willing to invite criticism in order to focus 
attention upon substantial problems and has 
considered it his obligation to help to improve the 
quality of the bar. He has been a significant catalyst for 
change. 
For Further Reading; among the more important 
presentations by the Chief Justice of his views on legal 
education are: "A Sick Profession?," 5 Tulsa L.J. 
1(1969); "The Special Skills of Advocacy," 42 Ford. 
L.Rev. 227(1973): "Some Further Reflections on the 
Problems of Adequacy of Trial Counsel," 49 Ford. 
L.Rev. 1(1980). 
Dr. Jeffrey B. Morris was a Judicial Fellow in the United 
States Supreme Court in 1977-78, and has continued as 




By Dr. Will 
For more than 260 years--from early in the eighteenth 
century to the final quarter of the twentieth--there has 
been a traditional relationship at the College of William 
and Mary between advanced studies in "liberal 
learning" and the professional preparation for the 
practice of law. The bicentennial of the formal chair of 
law in 1779. observed in a series of academic events 
during the 1979-80 year and climaxing in the 
occupancy of the new law building in the summer of 
1980. may best be understood as a watershed--on the 
one hand. offering a perspective back to the earliest 
days of the College itself. and on the other hand. 
looking to the changing professional needs of the 
future. 
Part of the uniqueness of the new Marshall-Wythe 
building derives from this retrospective and prospec-
tive character. Dominating the main foyer of the 
building are the two colored-glass panels representing 
Sir William Blackstone and Sir Christopher Wren. gifts 
of the faculty of law at All Souls College. Oxford. in 
recognition of the bicentennial of American legal 
education. Through the doorways between these 
panels. themselves reminders of the beginnings of legal 
education. may be seen the National Center for State 
Courts. a unique agency committed to the study of 
practical means of improving the administration of 
justice in all of the states for the future. 
Blackstone and Wren are former fellows of All Souls 
with close ties to the William and Mary story: Wren. 
the great English architect. is credited with the basic 
sketches for a "colledge" building which were then 
"adapted by certain gentlemen of the country" (Le .. 
colonial builders). Blackstone. the first occupant of the 
Vinerian chair of English law. and author of the classic 
Commentaries on the Laws of England. was. along with 
his chair. the model in large part for the pioneer chair 
of law at the Williamsburg institution 21 years later. A 
small brass plate adjacent to the "Oxford windows" 
describes the circumstances under which the All Souls 
faculty arranged to make the gift of the windows early 
in 1978. 
But the association of advanced studies and 
professional training goes back earlier than that. as a 
companion brass plate indicates. At the end of the 
seventeenth century. when the College was first 
chartered. the Virginia colony was emerging from its 
raw frontier character into something of a settled 
tidewater society. with growing commerical economy 
and the need for professional leaders in law and 
government. For those who could afford it. and had the 
ambition to do it. the reading of law at one of the Inns 
of Court in London was a logical means of getting a 
"head start" in what was beginning to be a highly 
competitive society. Taking advantage of the new 
n the History of 
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educational institution--a "grammar" or preparatory 
school complemented by what was a standard two-year 
course of university-level study -- colonials could go to 
London equipped to hold their own with students from 
Oxford and Cambridge also enrolling at one of the Inns 
of Court. 
One of the earliest William and Mary students to 
undertake this sequence of preparation was John (later 
Sir John) Randolph, one of seven sons of William 
Randolph of "Turkey Island," who attended the 
William and Mary preparatory and, probably, 
university courses of study between 1705 and 1713. 
Randolph then traveled to London and entered Gray's 
Inn on May 17, 1715. His "pre-legal" education, as well 
as some practical legal experience he had between 
1713 an 1715, paid dividends; Randolph was called to 
the bar of the Inn two years later, well ahead of the 
normal three-year study period; and by 1718 he was 
back in Virginia ready to take his place among his 
professional peers. 
The Randolph tradition--one family's example 
among others--substantially contributed to the 
identification of advanced study and the law at 
William and Mary. Sir John's sons, Peyton the Patriot 
and John the Loyalist, both followed their father's 
example of study at the College and qualification for 
the bar at the Inns of Court. His grandson 
Edmund--later to become the first Attorney General of 
the United States--also attended the College, but read 
his law under his father and uncle; for now, on the eve 
of Independence, there were changes in the common 
law as practiced in Virginia which foreshadowed the 
need for an "Americanized" course of study. 
In the Jefferson (rare book) Room of the law library 
are portraits of Sir John Randolph and his grandson, 
Edmund, visually commemorating the earliest 
association of law and education at William and Mary. 
Also in this room are representations of Thomas 
Jefferson and John Marshall (both Randolph kinsmen), 
in whose careers the transition to an "Americanized" 
law and a course of study in "Americanized" common 
law was to begin. Jefferson recognized that the 
knowledge of the English parent stock was essential; in 
writing about reading for the bar, early in the 
nineteenth century, he urged four treatises as 
fundamentaI--Bracton, for the common law as it was 
epitomized in medieval times; Sir Edward Coke, for the 
beginning of the Stuart age; Matthew Bacon, for the 
state of the law after the Restoration; and Blackstone, 
for the "modern" law. 
But Jefferson also recognized that an American law 
was essential for practical legal study--and who better 
to offer instruction in such law than his own mentor, 
George Wythe, who with Jefferson had been 
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responsible for most of the famous "revisal" of the 
common law after the Revolution? So Wythe, an 
experienced tutor for a generation of aspirants to the 
bar before the chair of law was established, was the 
logical choice to be the first professor of law in the 
United States. Marshall, one of his first students, read 
his law from Bacon, one of Jefferson's recommended 
books--and St. George Tucker, who succeeded Wythe a 
decade later as second professor of law, would prepare 
the first American notes to Blackstone. 
The Jefferson Collection in the rare book room will, 
when it is completed, replicate the law library of 
Jefferson himself, much of it undoubtedly collected 
under the guidance of Wythe. But the rare book room 
will also preserve the artifacts and mementoes of 
earlier legal studies associated with William and 
Mary--photostats of the admissions of Sir John 
Randolph and his sons to the hms of Court, and 
eventually a facsimile reproduction of the Randolph 
"conunonplace book" used at Gray's Inn in 1715. 
Marshall-Wythe's Jefferson Rare Book Room 
The William and Mary chair was quite consciously 
modeled after both the Vinerian chair at Oxford, and 
the practical training offered by the Inns of Court. St. 
George Tucker--who had been originally intended for 
enrolhnent at the Middle Temple--in his 1803 
introduction to the "American Blackstone," wrote that 
until the Commentaries were published, "the students 
of law in England, and its dependencies, were almost 
destitute of any scientific guide to conduct their 
studies." He added that "even in those Inns of Court 
whither those who sought to acquire a knowledge of 
the profession, generally repaired for instruction," 
teaching materials were sparse. 
Since the pragmatic American approach, of necessity 
in colonial times, had been to merge activities which in 
the mother country had developed separately--law and 
equity actions were heard in the same court, although 
on different court days; and the distinction between 
solicitors (office practitioners) and barristers (trial 
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lawyers) was never followed--it was logical to merge 
the two elements of legal education. Thus the 
university-level study of law introduced at Oxford in 
1758, and the formal apprenticeship represented in 
such centers as Gray's Inn or the Temple, simply 
became two parts of the same program in the William 
and Mary law curriculum. This was quite clearly set 
out in the formal university "statutes" for the law 
degree, which stipulated a course of study embracing 
history, law and government as well as practical 
examinations in specific subject-areas of the 
profession. 
The demand for instruction in the new American law 
began to spread in the generation after indenpendence; 
Justice James Wilson of the Supreme Court offered a 
series of lectures, primarily on the Constitution, at the 
University of Pennsyvania; Tapping Reeve's famous 
proprietary school at Litchfield, Connecticut, appeared 
soon after the William and Mary chair; law was an 
element in the opening curriculum of the University of 
Virginia in 1819; and the most famous chair to be 
occupied by a jurist was probably the Dane 
Professorship at Harvard, expressly created for Joseph 
Story in the early 1830s. For twenty years there was a 
renowned proprietary law school in Cumberland 
County, Virginia, founded in 1821 by Judge Creed 
Taylor; and another was operated in Winchester by one 
of St. George Tucker's sons, Henry. 
Another Tucker son, Beverley, brought the pre-Civil 
War law program at William and Mary to its apogee in 
the 18305 and 18405.' Beverley, a committed 
states-rights constitutionalist, indeed gave his name to 
the so-called "Southern school" of legal education in 
this ante-bellum period. The curriculum was as 
exacting as ever; the catalog for 1839-40 stipulated 
reqUired reading in Vattel's Law of Nations, the famous 
Federalist essays on the Constitution, St. George 
Tucker's American notes on Blackstone, Kent's 
Conunentaries, Stephens on Pleading and Starkie on 
Evidence. In addition, said a course description: "A 
sort of moot court is contrived by devising cases which 
the students are required to conduct to issue; and 
which are generally so managed as to lead to an issue of 
law; on which briefs are handed in, argument heard, if 
necessary, and judgments pronounced." 
The crippling effects of the Civil War on the College 
in general, and the law program in particular, forced a 
hiatus of sixty years in the historic law program. The 
modern period dates from a revival in 1922. The third 
century began with the opening of the new building in 
1980. 
Dr. WilJiam F. Swindler is John Marshall Professor of 
Law, Emeritus, at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law. 
Professor Swindler, a prolific author in the field of 
legal history, had his most recent book, The Consti-
tution and Chief Justice Marshall. published in 1971:1. 
He is now preparing a three-volume series of studies on 
the Bicentennial of American Legal Education. 
Tremors of a New Beginning 
By Larry D. Willis 
Many changes have accompanied the moving of the 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law from its historic setting 
on the old William and Mary campus to the new 
facility one mile away. Most of the differences are 
readily apparent: modern building, spacious library, 
comfortable classrooms. Other, more subtle, changes 
include. better cooperation with the legal community, 
higher student morale, and an effect on the surround-
ing neighborhood. 
"The plusses outweigh the minuses overwhelming-
ly," says Dean William Spong. "Library space is our 
most important addition. We now have the capacity to 
seat every student; the collection is divided and 
displayed to facilitiate research; and the acoustical 
classrooms better lend themselves to teaching. In short, 
the whole atmosphere for instruction is better." 
Dean Spong cites other beneficial aspects of the new 
facility including an innovative moot courtroom which 
he believes contributed to the success of this year's 
National Moot Court teams. 
The moot courtroom itself is, in addition to 
providing an fine teaching forum, attracting 
considerable attention from the legal community. 
Many curious attorneys and judges have toured the 
facilities which are as technologically advanced as any 
in the country. Already, administrative hearings have 
been held there, and state hearings are imminent. 
These and other contacts with the practicing bar in 
Virginia are establishing relations which will benefit 
Marshall-Wythe students now and in the coming years. 
Marshall-Wythe's Next-Door Neighbor: National 
Center for State Courts. 
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Another legal relationship with far-reaching 
possibilities exists between the law school and the 
National Center for State Courts. Each is, in a large 
measure, responsible for the presence of the other. The 
National Center was formerly based in Denver but was 
swayed in its search for new headquarters by the idea 
of close cooperation with a good law school. To be 
effective, the two needed to be very close. The only 
available tract of land large enough for two such 
buildings was the former site of Eastern State Hospital, 
given to the college when that institution moved to 
Dunbar. The National Center leased its grounds from 
the college for a nominal sum and started construction 
in May of 1976. With such a commitment as the actual 
construction, William and Mary finalized plans for the 
new law school and broke ground in the Fall of 1977. 
Relations between the two institutions have been 
pleasant and productive. A joint committee is studying 
areas of cooperation and has already hosted a very 
successful symposium on "State Courts and 
Federalism in the 1980's." They are also sponsoring an 
essay contest for Marshall-Wythe students and are 
adding to the curriculum in the realm of judicial 
administration. Many current students work "next 
door" and value both the experience and convenience 
of their jobs there. 
Student life has changed dramatically with the law 
school's change of venue. Gone are the ivy-covered 
walls, tree-lined brick sidewalks and convenient access 
to the main campus. "Everything is under one roof 
here," is a common remark. The four-building 
approach of the on-campus days, including Old 
Rogers, James Blair and Camm, did not promote a sense 
of unity. It was difficult to think of a building with 
classes in it as a body of students. First year students 
were gone by noon every day; the upper-classes 
seemed to meet in the afternoons; and very few of 
either group chose to stay any longer than they had to. 
There was little interaction between students outside of 
class, the majority of students took little interest in 
changing the situation. 
Expanded and more pleasant surroundings are now 
causing more people to spend more time at the law 
school. The distance from other facilities results in 
dinners to heat and eat in the lounge. Individual 
lockers make it possible to keep books and other 
personal belongings close at hand. Generously donated 
oriental rugs and comfortable chairs create a relaxed 
atmosphere in the main lobby - fine for studying, better 
still for not studying. These factors combine to bring a 
diverse group of 450 law students closer together. 
In the air-conditioned comfort of an elaborate edifice, 
it is much easier to have a positive attitude toward 
Marshall-Wythe as a fine institution for the study of 
law than it was in the flooded basement of an 
inadequate library. This new found pride in a mere 
building has carried over into pride in what the school 
has become. what it has the potential to achieve. 
Physical plant can often affect attitudes and it has done 
so in this case. More students are interested in what 
happens in and with their school. as evidenced by 
larger voter turnout in student elections. more 
involvement in special events and a willingness to 
work to make the school better still. 
There is a general feeling that the new law school 
building is improving the academic life at Marshall-
Wythe. Apart from the obvious advantages of 
well-designed lecture rooms and outstanding library 
facilties. the professional atmosphere which pervades 
the building almost creates an eagerness to study. Long 
hours of reading. briefing and researching are made as 
painless as possible in a place which actually seems to 
be designed for utility. 
"Cars are the most visible and most resented aspect of 
the school." 
Few people in the law school community realize the 
profound effect that the new building has had. and 
will continue to have on the surrounding 
neighborhood. Not much thought has been given to the 
repercussions resulting from the intrusion each day of 
hundreds of students. faculty and visitors. 
Picture South Henry Street before 1976. Small 
amounts of traffic travelled what more closely 
resembled a country road than a city street. It was a 
quiet neighborhood. traditionally and predominantly 
black. nestled on the outskirts of town. Even the 
presence of Eastern State Hospital failed to disrupt the 
area. 
It is 1981 and things have changed. Traffic is steady 
now on that same road. the curb lined with overflow 
from the school parking lot. Cars are. in fact. the most 
visible and most resented aspect of the school. Resident 
complaints of nuisance and minor property damage led 
to the proliferation of "no parking" signs along the 
sidestreets and beside driveways. Even now. students 
deprive many from parking in front of their own homes 
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or receiving personal visitors who might drive by. 
South Henry Street. from Francis Street to' South 
Boundary. is presently zoned for limited business and 
it is expected that several private offices will join 
Southern Bank and C&P Telephone Co. along that side 
of the street. From South Boundary Street on past the 
law school. South Henry Street is now zoned 
"Residentail C." This is a medium-density rating 
satisfied by apartments and townhouses. Currently. 
there are no apartment building or townhouses on 
South Henry Street. 
In the years since construction of the National Center 
for State Courts and the law school. property values 
have increased dramatically. The average assessed 
value of all land in Williamsburg has increased 
between twenty-five and thirty percent in the last few 
years. The neighborhood surrounding these bastions of 
higher education contains parcels which have 
increased 200. 300. even 400 percent in some 
instances. The city real estate assessor predicts another 
twenty percent increase this year. 
Increasing property taxes and the possiblity for 
capital gains will force many landlords to make other 
use of their property. and even many homeowners will 
be unable to remain in this immediate area because of 
its rising costs. Townhouse units are nearing 
completion on South Boundary Street. less than a block 
from the law school. It is only a matter of time before 
the tight housing market in Williamsburg makes 
similar construction a reality on South Henry Street. 
displacing people who. in many instances. have lived 
there all their lives. 
The construction of the new law school building has 
enriched the experience of the students by providing 
better facilities and closer relations with the practicing 
bar. The benefits are abundant and widespread. but 
they are not given free of charge. Marshall-Wythe's 
future. and the impending commercial development of 
the surrounding neighborhood. will come at a great 
expense to those who know nothing of Moot Court or 
Federalism in the 1980·s. Increased comfort and 
spacious surroundings for students will eventually 
bring about discomfort and a change in surroundings 
for the current neighborhood residents. The costs and 
benefits have been weighed and the residents have 
lost. Their involuntary sacrifice will further the goals of 
urban development and academic excellence. leaving a 
debt for Marshall-Wythe students to repay through 
service to the community. 
Larry D. Willis is a second year law student from 
Portsmouth. Virginia. In 1979. he received a B.A. in 
English from Hampden-Sydney College. Larry spent 
his winter vacation working for the Dakota Plains Legal 
Services on the Standing Rock Indian Reservation in 
Ft. Yates. North Dakota. Mr. Willis is presently serving 
as President of the Student Bar Association at the 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law. 
Legal Scholarship and the Mission of a 
Law Faculty 
By Charles Koch and Frederick Schauer 
People who wish to comment pejoratively on the 
values that prevail in an academic institution often 
refer to the phenomenon of "Publish or Perish." By 
contrast, one never hears reference to "Teach or 
Perish" as a case of misplaced values. The clear 
implication is that scholarly publication is little more 
than an extra, and that academic institutions that 
consider it vitally important have in some way mislaid 
their priorities. Since this and other law schools of 
equivalent prominence require scholarly publication as 
well as excellence in teaching from their faculties, it 
seems that either much of the popular wisdom is 
wrong, or that all of the country's major law schools 
. have in some way gone off the rails. Because we believe 
in the importance of scholarship and research by law 
faculties, we felt that it might be useful to explain the 
sources of this belief. 
In a way it seems bizarre that two academics should 
have to defend the need for research and scholarship. If 
we worked in a physics department or a chemistry 
department we would find that the value of pure 
research or pure thinking was recognized instantly. 
Why then must law professors accept a challenge to 
defend what in almost any other discipline would be 
considered the backbone and the very currency of the 
academic environment? The answer, perhaps fortu-
nately and perhaps unfortunately, is complex. 
Some students, some practititioners, and, interest-
ingly, some law professors often ridicule expansive 
and abstract thinking and writing by those who teach 
in law schools. Legal education, it seems to many, 
should produce mechanics, and thus legal educators 
should engage themselves entirely in diagramming the 
functioning of the machinery. No one doubts that 
transmitting the technicalities, the language, and 
occaSionally the secrets of the guild is a legitimate part 
oHegal education. The mistake comes in assuming that 
it is the only part. 
Though lawyering is not an art form in the same way 
that painting or sculpture is, some analogy to the visual 
arts may help us to explore the relationship between 
the trade school and the academy. Within the visual 
arts we can. characterize two types of practitioners -
craftsmen and artists. Often the artists are craftsmen, 
and sometimes craftsmen produce art, but the two 
operate at different levels on the production of a 
pleasurable visual experience. The craftsman performs 
with great technical skin and dexterity. What he 
produces may be valuable and indeed enjoyable to look 
at regardless of whether it displays any creativity or 
imagination. The value of the work produced by the 
craftsman thus varies directly with the extent of the 
craftsman's skill. An artist also provides visual 
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pleasure, but the pleasure is derived from a different 
source. It is a mental and emotional experience of a 
wholly different kind from that produced by the 
competent craftsman. Some artists, like Picasso and 
Magritte, have been highly competent technical 
craftsmen as well. For others, such as Van Gogh, the 
technical skill is almost totally absent; but the artistic 
experience and pleasure is still very much there. While 
the artist's ability to produce pleasure does not 
necessarily rely on mechanical gifts, mechanical 
aptitude often makes it easier for the artist to express 
his creative ideas. Conversely, although a craftsman 
relies foremost on his technical skill, he surpasses the 
boundaries of that skill when he adds to his product 
that which we call artistic. Thus even in teaching the 
craftsman one must nurture the artistic intuition. In 
expanding the level of technical skill, one must fold in 
new and different intuitive notions. 
If we are to teach craftsmen we must concentrate on 
the skills that craftsmen need. But these skills are 
relatively easy to transmit, especially since we take 
pains to find those with particular aptitude for learning 
those skills. But it is the creative side of the law that is 
much more difficult to teach. Indeed, the creative 
- aspect is often thought to be almost completely 
intuitive. Yet to a great extent the creative side of the 
law is passed on from generation to generation. 
Through this process the state of the art is advanced, 
the societal benefit from the law increases, and the 
advances in the art pass quickly intq advances in the 
craft. These advances are important even to and 
perhaps especially to the individual craftsman because 
these advances allow the craftsman to reach beyond the 
boundaries of pure technical knowledge. Strong 
evidence exists for the propostion that the very best 
practical lawyers are those who are both highly skilled 
in their craft but who never ignore the potential for 
creativity. 
A major problem for the law teacher is how to convey 
this creative element of the law; how to bring the 
creative craftsman in touch with the creative aspects of 
the craft. This educational goal is unfortunately 
resisted by some elements of the craft guild of lawyers 
today, yet it is an important facet of the training of 
those who will soon be members of that guild. 
Since the creative aspect of the law is nurtured rather 
than transmitted in a simple fashion, the teacher must 
have a sense of it in order to be able to nurture it in 
others, particularly students. Legal scholarship, which 
at its highest form is the search for new and creative 
analyses of real problems, is the practice of legal 
creativity in its purest form. A legal educator who 
actively engages in creative scholarship is by definition 
-_._.- ........ -
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engaged in advancing beyond the frontiers of settled 
law. Engaging in legal scholarship therefore trains the 
legal educator to pass on the element of creativity to the 
next generation of lawyers. Furthermore, since 
creativity comes easiest when there is technical 
fluency, scholarship requires the teacher to develop 
technical skills in both teacher and student as the 
necessary foundation for creativity. 
Faculty scholarship has other direct effects on the 
quality of the instruction that is offered to students. 
The faculty member who is a productive scholar in the 
areas in which he or she is teaching is best able to deal 
with and convey a sense of the most important 
contemporary problems in the field. Closely allied to 
this is the fact that scholarly necessity requires the 
scholar to be conversant with all of the relevant 
materials and sources. Thus, active scholarship 
produces the teacher who is best able to teach the 
issues of today and of the future, and therefore best able 
to prepare students to practice today and in the future. 
Moreover, the teacher who is engaged in active 
scholarship is inevitably enthusiastic about that area, 
and can therefore exhibit and impart that special 
enthusiasm for the subject that is essential for a 
successful learning experience. It is, for all of these 
reasons, a major mistake to view classroom teaching 
and important scholarship as mutually exclusive. In 
most cases the two activities are mutually supportive. 
Although scholarship is therefore a fundamental part 
of successful teaching, it cannot be evaluated on this 
basis alone. Teaching is only part of the job of the 




is mistakenly characterized as "free" time. This free 
time, however, is not really ours. Society gives us this 
time so that it can be devoted to advancing the law. 
Members of a law faculty, unlike most practicing 
attorneys, have the time as well as the experience and 
expertise to contemplate broader issues. In few other 
fields of scholarly endeavor do academics have as 
much influence on the development of the field. 
Treatises and law review articles are frequently relied 
upon and cited by the courts. Law professors are 
usually prominent on committees dealing with rule 
and statutory revision, restatements, and broader 
proposals for law reform. Academic criticism often 
exercises a significant influence on the development of 
case and statutory law. While historians rarely make 
history, it is clear that law professors quite often make 
law. 
For these reasons. a reputation of a law school is 
highly correlated with the reputation of the scholarship 
produced by its faculty. Law schools that generate 
impressive scholarship also produce the complete law 
graduate: those who have been grounded not only in 
the technical skills, but who also have had nurtured 
that part of lawyering that parallels the creative aspects 
of the artistic intuition. It is far from a coincidence that 
students from the law schools best known for faculty 
scholarship go on to the best and most challenging 
legal positions. This is true even though some of these 
law schools do not concentrare on technical 
knowledge. As between technical skills and creative 
talents, any deficiency in the first is easily remedied in 
the early years of practice. but a deficiency in the 
second is virtually beyond remedy throughout the 
course of legal practice. An increase in scholarship 
thus justifiably increases the marketability of the 
students that a law faculty sends out into the 
profession. 
It is the duty of a law faculty to devote much of its 
time to activities that enhance the profeSSion and that 
further the service the profession performs for society. 
This public duty is especially important in the law. Un-
like the sciences. which set their own pace for 
development. the law must parallel society. It is 
inevitable that society will continually change. and law 
must change with society or it will fail to fulfill its 
societal function. A law faculty that fails to participate 
in this process of legal change has failed its public 
trust. 
Scholarship is therefore important to any law school 
in enhancing the learning experience of its students. in 
aiding the students and alumni whose careers ride on 
the reputation of the school. and in performing the 
function assigned to the institution by society. It is also 
a crucial factor in the ability of this school to continue 
to attract a highly qualified faculty and to retain the 
highly qualified faculty it now has. Faculty visibility 
and reputation also attract highly qualified students. 
on which so much of the school depends. 
Consequently. it is in the best interests of the entire law 
school community and those it services that 
scholarship be encouraged and enthusiastically 
supported. 
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The Marshall-Wythe School of Law's Post 
Conviction Assistance Project (P-CAP) is a federally 
funded legal assistance program which serves the dual 
purpose of providing students with clinical experience 
and assisting imprisoned individuals with their 
multi-faceted legal problems. To qualify for P-CAP 
services an individual must have been convicted of a 
crime and be presently incarcerated. Since the Project 
is federally funded. the bulk of student services are 
directed-toward federally incarcerated individuals. in 
particular. inmates of the Petersburg Federal 
Correctional Institution. Despite this priority. the 
project also offers assistance to state prisoners when 
time and resources permit. 
The major complaints issuing from the Petersburg 
inmates are habeus corpus petitions. 1983 actions. 
internal grievance and disciplinary procedure 
disputes. parole hearing issues. Criminal Procedure 
Rule 35 motions and detainers. Increased student 
participation has enabled P-CAP to address a larger 
percentage of the complaints received from inmates 
this year. Nevertheless. the influx of letters and 
petitions necessitate that priorities be set with respect 
to requests for assistance. Priority is given to federal 
inmates with complaints that do not interfere with the 
prison's administrative process. If P-CAP services 
cannot be provided for the particular inquiring 
prisoner. a concerted effort is made to provide a referral 
to alternative legal assistance resources or to advise the 
inmate on how to seek resolution through exhaustion 
of administrative remedies. 
Project members receive cases through maii 
solicitation and prison visits. Each participating 
member must make at least one trip to the federal 
penitentiary in Petersburg per semester and multiple 
visits are encouraged. Visits to the penitentiary are 
arranged by the Program Director and funded by 
P-CAP. Prisoners are informed of the "student 
lawyers' " arrival in advance and members are often 
greeted by a parade of inquiring inmates. As might be 
expected. many prisoners present diverse and 
apparently legitimate allegations. but some express 
mundane or spurious complaints and others merely 
seek conversation with "normal" outsiders. 
Most of a project member's work entails interviewing 
inmates. legal research of the respective issues and 
informing the inmates of the results. As every inmate. 
understandably. seeks to be released from prison. 
project members are seldom able to assist inmates to 
the full extent requested. However. they are often able 
to allay inmates' fears by educating them about 
intraprison rules or state and federal law. Recently. 
P-CAP members have been allowed to represent 
prisoners in parole or immigration and naturalization 
hearings and the third year practice program permits 
P-CAP to offer even more extensive student representa-
tion of an inmate under the supervision of a practicing 
attorney. 
The directors ofP-CAP have made a concerted effort 
in the past year to retain a flexible format for the 
program, while providing students with mor.e defi~ite 
guidelines within which to structure their project 
work. Three directors assume responsibility for the 
project; a Program Director, a~ Ad~ini~trati~e Direct?r 
and a Research Director. ThiS tllpartlte dlrecto~s~IP 
controls P-CAP functions under the careful superviSIOn 
of faculty member Professor John M. Levy. In addition, 
P-CAP has hired a part-time attorney-consultant, Ms. 
Christie Cyphers. to provide students with practical 
advice concerning the more difficult problems P-CAP 
encounters. 
Although students are given a great deal of leeway 
within which to handle their caseloads, promptness in 
responding to prisoner complaints is emphasized 
strongly. The major focus of the program is on the 
efficient. competent and timely processing of and 
response to prisoner complaints, rather than s~t~sfy~ng 
any rigid course requirements. Faculty partlclpa~lOn 
allows this clinical program to be offered as a credited 
course at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law. The only 
curriculum mandate is that the project members 
provide forty hours of service over the course of the 
semester and attend several mandatory seminars. 
These service requirements may be allocated to the 
project member's various prisoner complaints as the 
circumstances warrant or in accordance with the 
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student's interests. The course is given on a passifail 
basis. allowing a student to obtain one credit hour for 
participation in the program. 
P-CAP provides students with first-hand research 
experience accrued from participation in the program, 
but more significantly. it provides students with an 
invaluable opportunity to obtain clinical experience 
and to imbue past course work with a sense of 
practicality. In addition. valuable lessons are to be 
learned by all prospective lawyers who anticipate 
doing pro bono work or court appointed service. Com-
mon problems encountered by project members in 
interviewing inmates are communication barriers and 
the prisoner's defensiveness. In their eagerness to seek 
release by any means possible, inmates sometimes have 
been known to distort the facts or. at least. omit those 
facts most damaging to their interests. If nothing else. 
students learn to elicit the essential facts despite the 
communication barriers and they learn to overcome 
their fears of visiting a penal institution. On the whole, 
most inmates are sincere in their request for assistance. 
Therefore,P-CAP students are particularly frustrated 
by the prospect of delivering negative results from their 
legal research. However, the most satisfying aspect of 
P-CAP is the ostensible gratitude of prisoners for the 
services provided by the Marshall-Wythe students. 
Over the past year, greater emphasis has been placed 
on versing project members in the major areas of 
applicable substantive law and in familiarizing them. 
through group seminars, with available research tools. 
A number of seminars are scheduled each semester to 
aid students in developing necessary skills and 
knowledge. Seminars presented last semester included 
an interviewing techniques seminar; a lecture on 
relevant library resources: a film on a New Mexico 
prison made shortly before a major inmate riot: a 
lecture by Federal Judge Calvitt Clarke. of the Eastern 
District of Virginia, on habeus corpus petitions and 
1983 actions; and a discussion with prison inmates on 
the rehabilitative and nonrehabilitative aspects of 
prison life. Similar seminars are scheduled for this 
semester including discussions with a local Prosecut-
ing Attorney and a U.S. Parole Commission representa-
tive. Seminars are open to the public and uninhibited 
discussion is encouraged. While presenting a discus-
sion on the trials and tribulations of prolonged prison 
life last semester. a group of inmates addressed the 
stigmatization attached to imprisonment and openly 
confronted participating students about their personal 
views with regard to the moral character of inmates. 
P-CAP provides an essential service to both federal 
and state inmates. The Project eliminates false hopes 
created by jailhouse lawyers and assists inmates in 
obtaining their full legal rights. Furthermore. the 
Project serves to educate and experience prospedi\'p 
lawyers about the realities of dealing with our penal 
system. And. hopefully. P-CAP provides. in at least a 
limited fashion. a tool for facilitating change and 
improvement in the federal and state correctional 
systems. 
The Fourth Amendment protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures has always generated 
a great deal of judicial controversy and confusion. The 
judicial struggle continues as law enforcement 
agencies begin to use complex electronic surveillance 
devices. The problem arises in determining when an 
actual search or seizure has occurred. Attention will be 
given here to one of those devices, the beeper", and to 
the determination of whether its placement and 
monitoring constitutes a search and seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Different judicial 
approaches will be compared and the effect of recent 
court decisions will be explored. 
In applying Fourth Amendment rights and 
protections, the courts originally relied upon concepts 
of property law and trespass. A literal two step 
approach was followed. First, the protection was 
limited to searches involving an actual trespass and to 
seizures comprising the taking of material objects. 
Second, for a search to have occurred, a physical 
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area was 
required. Although this early doctrine was expressly 
repudiated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967), it may not have been completely abandoned. 
The nature of the intrusion and the area alleged to have 
been searched still appear to be important factors. 
ment protection. Factors the courts have considered in 
ascertaining whether the situation meets the test 
include the nature of the premises or activity, the 
extent of personal interest in the premises, society's 
characterization of the place or activity, and the steps 
taken by the person to maintain privacy. 
Although what appears to be paramount in Katz is 
that the government invade an individual's legitimate 
expectation of privacy, more is required than the mere 
violation of individual privacy. A search and seizure 
must also be involved. This conclusion is supported by 
the recognition in Katz that, "the Fourth Amendment 
cannot be translated into a general constitutional right 
to privacy." The Court did not abolish the requirement 
that a search be involved; it merely shifted its emphasis 
from the actual search to the invasion of individual 
privacy. In Katz, by listening to and recording Katz's 
words, the government violated the privacy upon 
which Katz justifiably relied, and by acquiring the 
information, searched and seized the actual content of 
his conversation. 
In attempting to resolve whether the placement and 
monitoring of a beeper is a search within the Fourth 
Amendment, the courts have used varying. and incon-
sistent approaches. The problem lies in determining 
which of these approaches best interprets the Fourth 
Amendment. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have arrived 
Electronic Surveillance and the Fourth 
Amendment 
By Ronald D. Kristobak 
In Katz, government agencies attached 'a listening 
device to a public telephone booth to monitor the 
conversations of a suspect. The United States Supreme 
Court held that such a nontrespassory invasion 
constituted a search and seizure because it violated the 
privacy upon which Katz justifiably relied while using 
the telephone. The Supreme Court's emphasis shifted 
from protecting places to protecting the individual's 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court 
interpreted the Fourth Amendment in a more abstract, 
flexible manner. Mr. Justice Stewart's majority opinion 
stated: 
The Fourth Amendment protects people. not places. What a 
person knOWingly exposes to the pUblic. even in his own home or 
office. is not the subject of Fourth Amendment protection ... But 
what he seeks to peserve as private. even in an area accessible to 
the public. may be constitutionally protected. 
Cases applying the Katz rationale have consistently 
adopted the twofold test in Justice Harlan's concurring 
opinion finding comfort in its well-defined guidelines 
and ease of application. Under Harlan's test, an 
individual must have exhibited an actual subjective 
expectation of privacy, and this expectation must have 
been one that society was prepared to recognize as 
reasonable. Besides focusing upon the actual search 
and seizure, the Court considered individual expecta-
tions and societal norms in applying Fourth Amend-
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at completely opposite decisions. 
In United States v. Holmes, 521 F. 2d 859 (5th Cir. 
1975), the Fifth Circuit held that monitoring a beeper 
was a search and seizure. Government agents had 
attached an electronic beeper to defendant's van while 
it was located in a public parking lot. The beeper 
ultimately enabled the agents to locate illegal drugs in 
the defendant's possession. The court found a search 
and seizure within the meaning of· the Fourth 
Amendment because the defendant possessed a valid 
expectation of privacy while in his vehicle. The court 
reasoned that although an individual may expect 
surveillance when he drives his vehicle, he can 
reasonably expect to be alone in his vehicle. 
Essentially, the Fifth Circuit extended the Katz 
rationale to monitoring the movement of motor 
vehicles. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the Ninth 
Circuit's determination in United States v. Hufford, 
539 F 2d 32, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976), that 
the monitoring of a beeper in a motor vehicle is not a 
search. In Hufford, a beeper was placed in a drum of 
caffeine legally purchased by the defendant. A second 
device was attached to the defendant's truck enabling 
government agents to locate a garage where they seized 
illegal drugs. The Ninth Circuit held that the 
monitoring of the beeper on the truck was not a search 
because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in defendant's movement and location on public roads. 
The court equated the use of the beeper with visual 
surveillance since the beeper only augmented what 
could be done by visual surveillance alone. 
Despite first impressions, the differences between 
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' decisions are not 
fundamental. The major distinction lies not with the 
determination of when a search occurs, .but with the 
determination's application to vehicular movement. 
The courts arrive at different results when applying the 
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard to 
movement. The difference springs from the analysis of 
the Katz statement that "what a person knOWingly 
exposes . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection." The Ninth Circuit considers movement on 
a public thoroughfare as something that one could 
reasonably expect to remain private. This appears to be 
a far too narrow reading of Katz. The Fifth Circuit 
approach embodies the entire context of the Katz 
rationale. Katz also stated that "what an individual 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible 
to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Thus, 
although an individual may anticipate visual surveil-
lance on public roads, he may also reasonably expect 
not to have his every move traced by an electronic 
device. 
Other circuit court decisions have further confused 
the issue. In United States v. Clayborne, 584 F. 2d 346 
(10th Cir. 1978), through the aid of a beeper placed in a 
drum of chemicals, government agents discovered 
defendant's clandestine laboratory. The court followed 
the Ninth Circuit view that the beeper merely 
facilitated visual surveillance, and hence no search was 
involved. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that since the 
clandestine laboratory in a commerical establishment 
was somewhere between a home and a motor vehicle, 
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The court also considered the fact that the 
police had probable cause to believe that the illegal 
activity was taking place. 
A decision that resolves these apparently inconsis-
tent approaches is United States v. Moore, 562 F. 2d 
106 (1st Cr. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978). In 
Moore, government agents placed one electronic 
device in a chemical container and another on 
defendant's truck. The beepers were used to monitor 
the individual's movements and to keep track of the 
chemicals in defendant's possession. The First Circuit 
distinguished between the use of a monitOring device 
to track a vehicle and the use of such a device to 
monitor the presence of chemicals in·the house. Use of 
the former beeper was not considered a search because 
of the· reduced expectation of privacy associated with 
motor vehicles. The court also considered the fact that 
the agents had probable cause for believ!ng a ~minal 
enterprise was underway. On the other hand, the 
beeper placed in the container was a search because it 
was an invasion of the privacy of the home. The court 
specified that the chemicals were not contraband or 
otherwise wrongfully in defendant's possession, and 
that the government had no right to monitor the 
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continued presence of noncontraband goods in 
defendant's home. When the defendant withdrew from 
public view, taking the chemicals inside the house, he 
had every right to expect that his activities in the house 
would remain private. Since the defendant had a 
justifiable expectation of privacy. the continued 
monitoring of non-public information constitutes a 
search. 
The most recent case to confront the beeper issue is 
United States v. Bailey. 628F. 2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980). In 
Bailey, government agents posing as suppliers of 
precursor chemicals, agreed to deliver the chemicals to 
the defendant. A beeper was placed in one of the drums 
which enabled agents to trace the drum to an apartment 
complex, and later after losing and regaining trans-
mission, to another apartment building. The signal was 
pinpointed to a locked storage room in the complex 
basement. After seventy-five days, when the beeper's 
signal began to weaken, the agents secured a warrant, 
later declared invalid, entered the complex and seized 
the chemicals. The defendants were then indicted for 
conspiracy to manufacture phencyclidine. The Sixth 
Circuit concluded that the government's use of the 
beeper for surveillance of noncontraband personal 
property in the private areas was a search and seizure 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Although the 
Sixth Circuit claimed to use Katz's justifiable 
expectation of privacy standard, the court invoked a 
unique analysis in reaching its decision. 
In Katz, because the individual legitimately expected 
the information or material the government acquired to 
remain private, the acquisition constituted a search and 
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Katz did not 
hold that every invasion of individual privacy formed 
the basis of a Fourth Amendment violation. Although a 
fine line existed between the two, Katz required both 
an invasion of privacy and a search and seizure. 
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment protected privacy 
only to the extent that it prohibited "unreasonable 
searches and seizures of persons, houses. papers and 
effects." 
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit appears to 
equate search and seizure with a government intrusion 
of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The court in Bailey considered irrelevant whether a 
particular government intrusion was classified as a 
search and seizure, but focused only upon whether the 
government acts violated an individual's legitimate 
expectation of pJjvacy. This general holding requiring 
only an invasion of individual privacy for a search and 
seizure to occur is far too broad and ignores past search 
and seizure requirements. Such analysis translates the 
Fourth Amendment into a general constitutional right 
to privacy which is precisely the fear Justice Black 
expressed in his dissent in Katz. Black feared the 
Court's use of a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept 
of privacy as a substitute for the Fourth Amendment's 
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The decision in the Bailey case may, however. still 
be correct, and a comparison of the decision with past 
approaches is helpful. The approach taken by the Fifth 
Circuit tn United States v. Holmes, that the monitoring 
of a beeper in motor vehicles is a search and seizure, 
appears to be harmonious with and goes beyond 
Bailey. The court in Bailey did not address the 
monitoring of movement issue. The monitoring in 
Bailey took place within an apartment, a traditionally 
protected area. The only real difference between the 
cases is the analyses used. and Bailey adds little to the 
Holmes decision. 
The approach of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Hufford. while in conflict with the Holmes decision, is 
consistent with Bailey.because it is distinguishable on 
the facts. The Ninth Circuit confined its consideration 
to the beeper attached to the truck which enabled the 
agents to locate the garage, ana failed to address the 
beeper in the chemical drum. As such. the court was 
only concerned with the beeper's role in monitoring 
movement. If the truck had been parked outside the 
garage, the court would have been correct in confining 
itself to the monitoring of movement issue. Yet, 
because the beeper actually intruded into the confines 
of the garage, the beeper not only searched defendant's 
movement, but also his property. 
On the other hand, the court in Bailey concerned 
itself with the beeper's intrusion into a private place. 
defendant's apartment. Although an individual may 
have a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle 
operated in public, he has a justifiable expectation of 
privacy within his apartment. In Bailey, since there 
cmildJ:ie no plain view of the object, the government 
would have been unable to acquire information not 
otherwise publicly available without the aid of the 
beeper. Therefore, Bailey presents a situation in which 
the Ninth Circuit may follow the Fifth Circuit and 
reach a similar result--the monitoring of an electronic 
tracking device in one's home is a search in violaion of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
The Tenth Circuit decision in United States v. 
Clayborne appears more difficult to reconcile. In 
Clayborne, the court relied partially upon the fact that 
the government had a probable cause belief that illegal 
activity was taking place. The government in Bailey 
may al~o have had a strong probable cause argument. If 
Bailey had relied on probable cause alone, a contrary 
result may have been reached. But, the Sixth Circuit, 
like most courts, did not address the issue of probable 
cause in detennining whether the beeper was a search. 
Also, Bailey may be distinguished from Clayborne 
on the facts. The laboratory in Clayborne was a 
commercial establishment that was susceptible to 
outside viewing and accessible to the public. 
Therefore. it is arguable that the defendant in 
Clayborne had no reasonable expectation of privacy. In 
Bailey the government intruded into defendant's 
apartment thus satisfying both the Katz requirements 
since it was a private establishment in which no illegal 
activities were occurring. 
Finally, Bailey appears to be totally consistent with 
the decision of the First Circuit in United States v. 
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Moore. Both cases involved the placement of a beeper 
in a drum. of noncontraband chemicals and 
monitorization of the beeper within a private area. Both 
courts concluded that there was a justifiable 
expectation of privacy under such circumstances. 
Bailey. however, confronts only one of the issues 
presented in Moore--the status of a beeper installed in a 
container that is later taken into a private area. It is 
unclear whether the court in Bailey would have 
followed the lessened expectancy of privacy in motor 
vehicles approach. The Bailey opinion states that it did 
not "establish a blanket rule that beeper monitoring of 
individual movement always brings the requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment into play," although a 
concurrring opinion strongly urged that the privacy of 
movement is protected. As these comparisons show, 
the Bailey result is entirely consistent with past 
decision. 
At this point, an analysis of the root of the problem, 
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is in 
order. The Fourth Amendment states that, "the right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated ... " The crux of the problem lies 
with the proper definitions of search and- seizure. A 
search is defined as a prying into of that which one has 
a right to and intends to conceal. A seizure implies a 
taking or removal of something from the possession, 
actual or constructive, of another. The primary 
question is, then, whether a beeper is to be classified as 
an aid to visual surveillance or as an unreasonable 
search and seizure. 
. The contrasting view of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits 
stem from this categorization of electronic tracking 
devices. The Ninth Circuit in Hufford equated the 
beeper with visual surveillance, and since visual 
surveillance did not constitute a search, an electronic 
tracking device furnishing similar information also did 
no constitute a search. Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit 
considered the tracking device much more intrusive 
than mere visual surveillance; its characteristics of 
attachment, continuity and duration of monitoring, 
and ability to trace location in private and public areas 
distingUished it from visual surveillance and made it a 
search. 
In support of the conclusion that the beeper is 
equivalent to visual surveillance, it is argued that the 
beeper is capable of revealing only location and 
movement and, therefore, is no more intrusive than 
traditional visual tailing. The only location infonna-
tion the beeper conveys is that the monitored item 
entered specific private property. Thus, the govern-
ment intrusion stops at the door of the constitutionally 
protected area. In this light, the beeper is similar to 
binoculars, tracking dogs, radar and search lights. The 
counterargument is that the beeper does much more 
than facilitate visual observation. Because the beeper 
goes where the law enforcement officer cannot go 
without violating the Fourth Amendment and acquires 
infonnation not publicly visible, the beeper's locatio.n 
within a constitutionally protected area is a search. 
It is difficult to perceive how the use of the beeper in 
Bailey cannot be considered a search and seizure. The 
beeper phYSically intruded into a place protected by 
the Fourth Amendment, and it acquired information 
not publicly visible in which the defendant had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The defendants 
exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy by 
bringing the monitored drum into the apartment's 
locked storage room. Since the drum contained 
noncontraband chemicals. the defendants expectation 
was one that society should recognize as reasonable. 
Also. the beeper's physical intrusion and acquisition of 
private information constituted requisite search and 
seizure to fulfill the Katz requirements. 
In search and seizure cases, the court must balance 
the individual's right to privacy with the government's 
right of lawful intrusion necessary to enforce our 
nation's laws. A holding that every private invasion is 
a search and seizure tips the scale too far in favor of 
individual privacy inerests since every type of 
government surveillance would constitute a privacy 
invasion and. hence, a search and seizure. The specific 
holding in Bailey that beeper surveillance of 
noncontraband property in private areas constitutes a 
search and seizure strikes a justified balance. The 
decision does not foreclose government opportunity to 
use a beeper, but only requies that a valid search 
warrant be obtained before a beeper is installed. 
Most courts will probably continue to follow the Katz 
rationale requiring both an invasion of individual 
privacy and a search and seizure to invoke Fourth 
Amendment protection. Nearly all courts will consider 
electronic tracking devices taken into constitutionally 
protected areas as searches and seizures. However. the 
cases indicate that some couts are unwilling to afford 
Fourth Amendment protection to the movement of 
motor vehicles. Whether the alleged privacy invasion 
occurs in a home. automobile or telephone booth. 
Fourth Amendment protection may be involved. In 
order for the Katz pronouncement that, "the Fourth 
Amendment protects people" to have any substance. 
Fourth Amendment protection should be invoked 
whenever a search and seizure is involved and an indi-
vidual's reasonable privacy interest is invaded. 
* The beeper is a miniature. battery-powered radio transmitter that 
emits recurrent signals at a set frequency. By attaching tha beeper 
to an individual's property and monitoring tha signal. the police 
can electronically track the property and the subject. 
Ronald D. Kristobak is a second year law student from 
Dunbar, Pennsylvania. In 1979 he graduated summa 
cum laude from Thiel College with a B.A. in Political 
Science and Sociology. This summer Ron will be 
employed by the law firm of Buchanan, Ingersoll. 
Rodewald, Kyle and Buerger in Pittsburgh, Pennsyl-
vania. As a member of the 1980-1981 Marshall-Wythe 
Law Review staff, Mr. Kristobak authored a comment 
pertaining to the use of "beepers" by police officials. 
28 
Shield Laws . .. 
ruled that the phrase "in the course of gathering or 
obtaining news for publication" qualified the 
definition of "news". The court reasoned that only 
information upon which published stories are based 
fall within the statutory protection. The court. in 
addition. attached a requirement of confidentiality 
withthe source. Here, the court ruled. the manuscript 
was not obtained under "a cloak of confidentiality." 
The court also found that in this case the privilege had 
been waived via publication of the letter itself. 
The court also established a positive burden of proof 
for a reporter who claims the privilege: 
In order to raise successfully the claim of privilege. two essential 
elements must be established; first. this information or its source 
must ba imparted to the reporter under a cloak of q:.nfidentiality. 
i.e .• upon an understanding. express or implied. that the informa-
tion or its sources will not be disclosed; and second. that the 
information. or its sources must be obtained in the course of gather-
ing news for publication. 
The court, through its narrow interpretation of the 
statutory language, created Ii rebuttable presumption 
against the privilege. The reporter could only 
overcome this presumption by meeting the two-part 
test. 
Within three years of Wolf the New York courts 
began questioning the constitutionality of the shield 
law. In People v. Monroe 17 the court questioned 
whether the shield law represented an unconstitutional 
intereference by the legislature with the contempt 
powers of the court, a violation of the principle of 
separation of powers. This attack against the shield 
lawll which only granted a protection from contempt 
had been coined by the California Court of Appeals in 
1971. The New York court also raised the possibility 
that the shield law was an unconstitutional defiance of 
the Bronzburg ruling. The 1975 amendments placed 
the law's validity "in greater doubt than ever before." 
the court stated. 
The most recent judicial pronouncements on the 
statutory newsman's privilege focus primarily on the 
issues of confidentiality and waiver. In each of the last 
four years a New York Supreme Court has ruled that a 
reporter may not claim the privilege unless he can 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
information or its source was imparted to him under a 
cloak of confidentiality, i.e., an expressed or implied 
understanding. Of secondary importance, because it 
was easier to prove. was the required showing that the 
reporter had been gathering news for publication when 
he received the subpoenaed information. 
In each of the four cases the privilege was ruled to 
have been waived for various reasons. In one case the 
privilege was waived when one source met with 
members of the prosecutor's staff and the other spoke to 
reporters at public meeting in the town hall without an 
·expressed or implied understanding of confidentiality. 
In two other cases the privilege was deemed waived 
when the reporter's source testified either at trial or 
before the grand jury. In the most recent case the court 
considered the reporter's intention to write a book on 
the incident a waiver of the privilege. 
The New York courts also took an increasingly 
narrow approach to the scope of the words 
"professional journalist." In People v. LeGrond18 the 
individual who claimed the privilege was an author of 
books, magazine articles, documentary films and news 
broadcasts and a winner of the 1967 Peabody Award for 
television journalism. He was subpoenaed while 
preparing a television special on organized crime. The 
court refused to recognize him as a professional 
journalist under the statute. The colrect test for who 
qualifies as a professional journalist focuses on who the 
claimant's employer is, not the content of the material 
or the background of the claimant, the court stated. The 
court may have been trying to avoid the impermissible 
examination of the content of the publication, but in 
doing so, set up a narrow test based on employment. 
This approach assures only that the state's "establish-
ment press" can seek the protection of the privilege 
and it may, in fact, exclude many others who should be 
protected in keeping with the statute's policy of en-
couraging a robust dialogue. 
New York may be the home of the country's most 
respected newspaper, but in the state's courts, neither 
the press nor the privilege receive much respect. The 
statutory privilege has been severely deflated by the 
courts, and may be declared unconstitutional in the 
future. The institution of a strong privilege in New 
York can only occur through two scenarios: the 
amendment of the present statute, perhaps along the 
lines of New Jersey's new law, or, following 
California's lead, the addition of the statutory language 
to the state's constitution. Neither seems likely in the 
near future, 
California 
In California the newsman's privilege was enacted 
into law in 1965. As in New York, the legislative 
mandate soon suffered a series of setbacks in the state's 
courts. But in California the legislature and general 
populace responded to the courts' attacks on the 
privilege, and elevated the reporter's protection to the 
constitution by adding it to the state's first amendment 
in last June's primary. 
California's original shield law only protected the 
source of any information procured for publication or 
broadcast and actually used in this manner. But the 
statute was rather broad in its coverage. Any publisher, 
editor, reporter or other person connected with or 
employed upon or by a newspaper, press association, 
wire service, radio or television could claim the 
privilege. The privilege could be asserted anywhere, 
but was necessarily qualified in that it only protected 
reporters from citation for contempt. 
The law's protection was expanded and its strict 
publication requirement eased through amendment in 
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1974. Under the amended shield law, in addition to the 
source, the report&r was protected from disclosing any 
unpublished information obtained while gathering 
information for communication to the public. The 
requirement in the original law that the information 
related to the reporter by the source had to be 
published or broadcast was deleted. These amend-
ments placed the California shield law in line with 
some of the other more progressive laws. 
The first major court test of the California shield law 
occurred in 1971. 19 This case grew out of the 
prosecution of Charles Manson and his co-defendents 
for two sets of multiple murders. Early in the 
proceedings the court issued an Order re Publicity, 
prohibiting any attorney, court employee, attache or 
witness from releasing for public dissemination the 
content of any testimony that might be given a't trial. 
Farr, a reporter for the Los Angeles Herald Examiner 
received copies of prospective testimony of a 
prosecution witness from three persons involved in the 
litigation. Much of the information contained in the 
leaked testimony was printed by the newspaper, 
despite the fact that most of it was not admitted as 
evidence at trial. 
After judgment the court convened a hearing to 
determine the source of the Herald Examiner story. 
Farr topk the stand and acknowledge that two of the 
sources were among the six attorneys-of-record in the 
trial. Farr refused to identify the third source, even 
though he admitted that this person was also subject to 
the court order. Farr based his refusal to answer on the 
. state's shield law, but the trial court cited him for 
contempt. 
The California Court of Appeals, in affirming the 
contempt citation, found no need to determine the 
proper construction of the language of the shield law. It 
ruled that to grant Farr an immunity on these facts 
would countenance an unconstitutional interference 
by the legislative branch with an inherent and vital 
power of the court to control its own proceedings and 
officers. The court stated: 
The power of contempt possessed by the courts is inherent in their 
constitutional status. While the Legislature can impose reasonable 
restrictions upon the exercise of that power or the procedure by 
which it may be exercised. it cannot "declare that certain acts shall 
not constitute a ... contempt. 
The court reasoned that the extension of the privilege 
to Farr by the legislature would violate the principle of 
separation of powers because it would severely impair 
the trial court's performance of a constitutionally 
compelled duty to control its own officers. Here the 
court had attempted to protect the defendant's 
constitutional rights by issuing the order. Once issued, 
the court was bound to explore any violations of its 
order by its own officers. And without the ability to 
compel Farr to reveal his source the court would be 
powerless to diScipline violaters. In conclusion the 
court added that the Supreme Court's mandate that the 
trial courts control prejudicial publicity emanating 
from "court sources," could only be properly 
discharged 
if the courts are able to compel disclosure of the origins 
of such publicity. 
The result inFarrwas followed in Rosato v. Superior 
Court20• The court ordered the jailing of three Fresno Bee 
staff members for refusing to answer questions about a 
series of articles in the paper quoting passages from a 
sealed grand jury transcript. The court ruled that the 
privilege, although still valid, was not applicable when 
the questions asked the reporter tend to identify who, if 
anyone, among those subject to a court order, may have 
violated it. The judge cited the Farr reasoning; that the 
separation of powers doctrine prohibited the 
legislature from telling the courts that certain acts did 
not constitute contempt. Cases in two of California's 
other appellate districts also went against newsmen 
basing their refusal to answer questions on the 
statutory privilege. 
The results in these cases led proponents of an 
absolute shield law to seek the inclusion of the 
newly-amended law in the state constitution. The 
result of this effort was Proposition 5, which took the 
amended version of the law and elevated it to a part of 
the state's first amendment. Proposition 5 appeared on 
the ballot in June. Proponents of the measure contend-
ed that the constitutional amendment solved the 
court's separation of powers argument. Opponents 
argued that the amendment was defective in two re-
spects; first, it did not specifically state that court con-
trol of the contempt power is not paramount to the 
amendment's protection, and second, that the amend-
ment does not guarantee that its provisions cannot be 
overridden by the fifth and sixth amendments of the 
Constitution. The state's voters approved the amend-
ment in June by a three-to-one margin (4.3 million to 
1.5 million). 
The California courts, like those in New York had 
effectively circumvented. the legislatively mandated 
privilege with a separation of powers argument. The 
elevation of the privilege to the state's first amendment 
can be considered a signal to the state courts that 
public policy supports an absolute newsman's 
privilege. But how effective the constitutional privilege 
will be in practice is not yet clear. The impact of 
Proposition 5 has yet to be tested. in the California 
courts. 
Conclusion 
This survey of various state approaches towards 
granting a testimonial privilege to reporters and the 
judicial interpretations of them seems to lead to only 
one indisputable conclusion: the protection afforded 
reporters from disclosure of confidential sources and 
information varies depending upon the jurisdiction. 
Journalists across the country face differing degrees of 
judicial interference with their newsgathering 
activities. 
The statutes themselves differ markedly. Thirteen of 
them protect only the source. The others protect 
information and sources. Six statutes require 
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publication for the privilege to exist. fifteen do not 
require it, and the other laws are silent on the matter. 
shield laws quite narrowly, often depriving reporters of 
their protection. 
The twenty-six laws differ with regard to persons and 
media covered and in other qualifications to the 
pri vilege. 21 
But a discernable trend at the state level indicates 
that the nation's privileges may have one common 
feature. Generally, the state courts are. interpreting .the 
To alleviate the inconsistencies among the state 
privileges, some have suggested the adoption of a 
federal shield law based on either the interstate 
commerce clause or the enforcement of the First 
Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 
The proposal's major positive attribute is uniformity. 
Critics cha~ge that any attempt to further legislate the 
privilege might encourage additional attempts by the 
government to regulate the press. Others argue that 
drafting such legislation would be an impossible task 
because of the problems of definition, balancing, and 
scope. They claim a workable result is impossible. 23 
Since the Congress already declined to pass a federal 
testimonial privilege when it promulgated the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, it is very unlikely that a federal 
shield law will be passed by Congress in the near 
future. 
About forty years ago Justice Hugo Black wrote, 
"Free speech and fair trials are two of the most 
cherished policies of our civilization and it would be a 
trying task to choose between them. 24 Black 
acknowledged that in a criminal trial these two 
freedoms often conflict, and that the only test a court 
could apply to safeguard both was one based on balanc-
ing.2S 
Where a reporter refuses to answer questions in a 
court of law. the press' first amendment right to gather 
news and the public's right to be informed must be 
balanced against the interests of the defendant and the 
public in a fair trial. Only a case-by-case balancing 
approach. perhaps something along the lines of that 
suggested by Justice Stewart in Branzburg. will 
acconunodate the conflicting interest. New Jersey's 
shield law - legislatively mandated balancing - offers a 
good example of one approach. It remains to be seen 
whether other states follow this approach though. No 
clear trend as to the future of the newsman's privilege 
is presently apparent. 
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Editor's Note: 
Legal education in America has entered its third 
centulY, the law school has moved into a new building 
and, on a grander scale, the law itself is changing. Per-
haps the most fascinating aspect of the study of law is 
its perpetual change; the law is not static. This 
magazine attempts to capture that mixture of past and 
future which determines the present state of our law at 
any given time. 
On a local level, articles examine the new law school 
and its impact on students and neighbors. 
On a national level, we explore the use of electronic 
tracking devices, a technological development the 
Founding Fathers could never have imagined yet, 
somehow, seem to have provided for in the Fourth 
Amendment. The amazing responsiveness of the U.S. 
Constitution to a burgeoning society and society's 
efforts to live with that vital document are themes of 
other articles. 
On an international perspective, rights to deep 
seabed resources are considered in relation to a pro-
posed United Nations treaty regulating the use of such 
resources. 
To play some role in the development of such law is 
the goal of students at Marshall-Wythe. Their role, 
their activities and the role of the faculty in preparing 
them to meet this challenge are the subjects of the 
balance of this issue. We offer the views of students 
and faculty from Marshall-Wythe, and the thoughts 
and statements of Chief Justice Warren Burger of the 
United States Supreme Court as compiled in an article 
by his research assistant. Dr. Jeffrey B. Morris. 
This issue of The Colonial Lawyer is.our first effort at 
such a publication. We have learned much in the 
course of creating it, and we look forward to returning 
the magazine to semi-annual publication next year. 
The world is indeed a transitolY place and the law is 
an ever-changing part of man's world. We hope to have 
captured a few relevant moments of it for you. 
We offer sincere thanks to all those who helped in so 
many ways and, particularly, the Publications Office 
and the Publications Council of the College of William 
and MalY. 
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